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In this thesis, the interest has been in the subnetwork of three companies and their 
mutual business relationships, which have been studied in the focal company’s supply 
network. The objective of this research has been to determine conditions for a triad 
forming and developing from relational properties perspective, and furthermore improve 
the project coordination and cost efficiency by utilizing the triadic business model in the 
focal company’s supply network. Wanted non-contractual cooperation between 
suppliers and increase in their self-directedness are also issues that have been addressed. 
 
Relational factors contribute to the easiness of cooperation in the business relationship. 
Actors’ relational easiness and collaborative willingness in triad context were examined 
by using the case study method. Utilized relational factors trust, commitment, 
collaboration, relational behavior and power were selected by the conceptual analysis of 
theory review. The empirical data regarding the relational properties in actors’ triadic 
relationships in five examined triads was collected in interviews with a questionnaire. 
Twelve interviews were recorded and transcribed, numerical data tabulated, and the 
whole empirical material analyzed. From the results, opportunities to form and develop 
collaboration in the triads were derived. 
 
Based on the results of relational measures the actors are willing and able to cooperate 
in the considered triads in the focal company’s project business environment. Promoting 
and hindering factors for forming and developing triads were also found. Trust and 
abuse of power are some examples of these factors. The best combination of triad type 
and its governance mechanism is case-specific. The objectives and business level affect 
the choice. There is a trade-off situation between self-directedness and controllability. 
Triad and its management were found to differ in the different business levels and 
phases of the project. Triads need to be adapted case by case. At the top business level 
contracts are negotiated and business relationships maintained. Project management 
level takes care of scheduling and controls that project is on schedule. At the lowest 
operational level, the actual project implementation is carried out according to the 
instructions, work orders and conditions. 
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PERHO, MIKA: Forming and Developing Triads in Supply Network 
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Tarkastaja: Prof. Rainer Breite 
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Tämän tutkimuksen kiinnostuksen kohteena on ollut kolmen yrityksen muodostama 
toimittajaverkoston osa, jonka keskinäisiä yrityssuhteita, niin kutsuttuja relationaalisia 
suhteita, on kohdeyrityksen toimittajaverkostossa tutkittu. Tavoitteena on ollut selvittää 
kolmen yrityksen muodostaman kokonaisuuden toimintaedellytyksiä ja siten lisätä 
projektinhallinnan tehokkuutta. Näitä tavoitteita vasten on asetettu tutkimus-
kysymykseksi: Minkälaiset edellytykset on relationaalisten tekijöiden näkökulmasta 
muodostaa ja kehittää triadeja toimijoiden yhteistyön edistämiseksi ja tehostamiseksi 
kohdeyrityksen toimittajaverkostossa? 
Työssä tarkasteltiin tapaustutkimuksen menetelmällä toimijoiden yhteistyösuhteen 
sujuvuutta ja triadiyhteistyöhalukkuutta käsiteanalyyttisen teoriatarkastelun perusteella 
valittujen relationaalisten tekijöiden avulla. Hyödynnetyt tekijät olivat: luottamus, 
sitoutuminen, yhteistoiminta, relationaalinen käyttäytyminen ja valta. Empiirinen 
aineisto koottiin teemahaastatteluissa, joissa kartoitettiin toimittajaverkostosta valittujen 
toimijoiden välisiä suhteita perustuen relationaalisiin tekijöihin. Lisäksi triadien 
muodostamisen ja kehittämisen edellytyksiä arvioitiin analysoitujen kysely-
mittaustulosten perusteella. 
Relationaalisten tekijöiden perusteella toimijoilla on halu ja valmius triadiyhteistyöhön 
kohdeyrityksen projektiliiketoimintaympäristössä. Triadiyhteistyön muodostamista ja 
kehittämistä edistäviä ja hidastavia tekijöitä löytyi tutkimuksessa, esimerkkeinä 
luottamus ja vallan väärinkäyttö. Sopivin triadityyppi ja hallintamekanismiyhdistelmä 
on tapauskohtainen. Tarkastelutaso ja tavoitteet vaikuttavat valintaan. Triadin 
itseohjautuvuuden ja hallittavuuden välillä on trade-off -tilanne. Triadin ja sen hallinnan 
havaittiin eroavan eri tarkastelutasoilla sekä projektin eri vaiheissa. Ylimmällä 
liiketoimintatasolla neuvotellaan sopimuksista ja ylläpidetään liiketoimintasuhteita. 
Projektin hallinnan tasolla aikataulutetaan ja ohjataan pysymään aikatauluissa. 
Alimmalla operatiivisella tasolla suoritetaan varsinainen projektin aikainen toteutus 
annettujen ohjeiden, työmääräysten ja olosuhteiden mukaan. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
New network business models are developed in FIMECC’s Rebus research program. 
The Tampere University of Technology Pori unit is involved in the Rebus research 
project and this thesis is a part of relational studies to be done during the Rebus project. 
In this thesis, the business relationships in buyer-supplier-supplier triad are studied. A 
new method or better way of working especially in non-contractual supplier-supplier 
relationship is proposed based on the measured states of relational properties in the case 
triads. Buyer’s aim is to utilize network business model better and reduce its own 
resources involved in controlling, monitoring and inspecting outsourced work which 
can be done solely by supplier collaboration. In order to get the suppliers to work 
desirably, suppliers’ capabilities, collaboration and self-directedness should be raised to 
the level that they could cooperate in triad without the continuous need for buyer acting 
as an intermediator and a supervisor to ensure the solid progress of tasks. Performance 
improvements, better cooperation, flexibility and cost savings are the objectives of 
relational business practices development in studied triadic business relationship 
context. Reduction of involved resources of the buyer should serve the latter objective at 
least in part. Integrated business development is required in order to realize the winning 
situation for all parties of triad i.e. the suppliers should also benefit and be taken into 
account equally in the business practices development. This will help on the way to the 
long-term relationships and partner network. 
This case study was done in project based business in engineering industry. The focal 
company’s supply network consists of about twenty key suppliers and tens of minor 
suppliers. The study concentrates on a supply network of six key suppliers of the focal 
company. The case company, focal company, lead company and buyer are the same 
entity in this study. The term supplier is also used alternatively for subcontractor. Here 
the buyer has a contract with six suppliers which are studied in five separate triads 
where buyer and supplier SS are involved in each triad and supplier S1, S2, S3, S4 and 
S5 in triad T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 respectively. Supplier SS has supporting and enabling 
role for co-supplier in each of these triads. Suppliers are in non-contractual relationships 
with each other. 
The current state of relationships is determined by survey done for each actor in 
considered triads. Answers to the predefined relational questions are analyzed. Based on 
the survey results the development ideas on relational behavior and activity in the triads 
are proposed in order to better meet the objectives set by the focal company i.e. in this 
case study context the buyer in buyer-supplier-supplier relationships. 
 2 
 
1.1. Objectives of thesis 
The objective of the thesis is to determine the relational conditions for triadic 
cooperation among parties involved in the case study. Another objective is to identify 
the relational factors that are likely to enable or hinder triad cooperation. The gap 
between the current and target states for each relational property is detected from data 
collected in the survey. Based on the survey results a proposal is given for improving 
the state of relational properties and activities which can increase the willingness of 
actors to form well-functioning triads and cooperate better for common good in triad. 
Change from the dyadic business model in use at starting point to the triadic business 
model aims to improve supplier-supplier cooperation and self-directedness in 
considered triadic business relationships. Additional objective of the case study is to 
initiate a development framework for better relational business practices by utilizing 
triads in the focal company’s supply network. One objective is to propose some 
development ideas and options for triads. 
1.2. Research problem and questions 
The research problem is to find enabling and hindering relational factors for forming 
and developing a triad and some means to improve the non-contractual supplier-supplier 
cooperation, self-directedness and mutual synchronization of tasks in the triadic buyer-
supplier-supplier relationship in such a way that the buyer can diminish its current 
monitoring, controlling and intermediator role and reduce related costs. 
To find a solution for the research problem the answers to the following research 
questions are tried to find out in this study. 
The main research question (MRQ) is: 
MRQ: What are the conditions for forming and developing a triad in the case study 
context? 
Related sub-questions (SRQs) are: 
SRQ1: How do the relational factors affect the current relationship of actors 
involved in the considered buyer-supplier-supplier triads? 
SRQ2: What are the challenges and opportunities to form and develop a triad in case 
study context? 
SRQ3: How can the circumstances for triad forming and developing be improved? 
SRQ4: How can the considered triads be governed? 
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Answers to these research questions are based on the results and analysis of the case 
study survey done to the actors involved in considered triads. 
1.3. Focus and structure of thesis 
The focus of the study is on the triadic relationship and cooperation and how to make 
these happen by taking into account and developing relational properties among the 
selected actors in the case company’s supply network. 
From theory perspective, the focus is on the relational constructs of triad business 
relationship. In widely used theoretical paradigms for interorganizational relationships 
research are the transaction cost economics, resource dependence, strategic choice, 
stakeholder theory, learning theory, and institutional theory (Barringer & Harrison 
2000, p. 369). Figure 1 depicts roughly the focal theory segment (circled area) on the 
economic-behavioral line of theoretical paradigms on which the case study is set. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Foundations of Interorganizational Relationships (Barringer & Harrison 
2000, pp. 381-382). 
Resource dependence theory focuses exclusively on resources that must be obtained 
from external sources for an organization in order to survive or prosper. No firm is self-
sufficient. It has to interface with its environment to obtain needed resources. How an 
organization does this, and whether variables such as transaction costs, opportunities for 
learning, and organizational legitimacy are considered, is left to other theories to decide. 
The resource dependence theory focuses on the need for critical resources and the 
necessity for social exchange (Barringer & Harrison 2000, pp. 372-374). Social capital 
forms in social exchange and requires relationship(s), which can be evaluated by 
relational properties. These issues are included in the focus areas of the study. 
The research framework is depicted in Figure 2, which illustrates the elements the study 
consists of as selected means and tools to get and analyze the research results for the 
substance of circumstances for triad forming and developing. 
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Figure 2. Research framework. 
The research method is case study in this thesis. Triad forming and developing is 
examined in supply network context. Buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier relationships 
are evaluated as part of considered buyer-supplier-supplier triad. Assessment of the 
relational condition and properties of triadic cooperation is done by the survey in which 
the state of relational properties in considered relationships are detected by interviewing 
people from companies involved in the case study. The current state and target state of 
relational properties are recognized by the interviews. Also willingness to increase self-
directedness in cooperation is asked as a possible mean to reduce the need for triad 
governance in part. Relational properties, as part of social capital and potential aids in 
social exchange, have impact on triad practices and governance mechanism as well. The 
importance of relational properties is emphasized as being a part of social capital, a 
possible competitive advantage, in use for establishing and utilizing close social 
relationships in business network for example in acquiring the necessary resources. 
How to get companies with necessary resources work together in the best possible way. 
This is studied in triad context. The opportunities and challenges in forming and 
developing triads are estimated based on the empirical results from the survey and 
findings in literature. 
The case study is delimited to the business triads, relationships and actors that are 
aiming for a long-term business relationship. Contractual issues are not taken into 
account in detail in this study. The focus of the survey is on evaluations of relational 
properties, finding preconditions for cooperation and issues for and against triadic 
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cooperation. Eventually, the evaluation of the state for triad forming and developing in 
buyer-supplier-supplier relationship from relational properties perspective is derived 
from the survey results. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. First, the theories utilized in the case study are 
presented. Theories of supply network, triad and relationship are presented in Chapter 2. 
Theory of relational properties and how these are part of larger theory context of social 
capital and social exchange are presented in Chapter 3. Second, the research 
methodology and material, the case study and survey, are presented in Chapter 4. Third, 
the empirical research results are presented in Chapter 5. Then finally the conclusions 
and discussion parts are followed in Chapter 6. 
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2. SUPPLY NETWORK 
In this study, the supply network is researched based on the relational perspective and 
evaluation of relational properties in the triadic relationships of supply network 
companies. Network structure, its building blocks and used network model are 
introduced. Network relationships are characterized by the type of structure, the roles of 
actors, strength, duration and quality. Relationships’ interconnectedness in network is 
also addressed. Theories in research framework should provide elements which help an 
actor and its relationships evolve by taking other involved actors and relationships into 
account and become a positive actor in a supply network, and eventually an actor in the 
supply network of partner relationships. 
There is no relationship or business and therefore neither business relationship in 
isolation. A relationship is needed between two business units in order to form a 
business relation. In the business relationship the parties are able to exchange 
information, knowledge, resources, services and products. The simplest relationship is 
dyadic in which two actors have a relation – a two-party relationship (dyad). Companies 
are not monogamous i.e. have only one relationship with one other organization. 
Companies are part of a network of relationships (Ritter 2000, pp. 317-326). 
Interorganizational relationships are many from suppliers to customers and financial, 
shareholding to regulating institutions among others that form business network. 
Network is a structure where number of nodes are related to each other by specific links. 
In business network the nodes are business units such as suppliers, producers, service 
companies and customers. The links are the relationships between the business units. 
Each business unit and relationship has unique content in business network. Business 
unit consists of human, technical and physical resources bound together. A relationship 
is a ‘quasi-organization’, which arises from the investment of human and physical 
resources by both companies. Business network is the result of complex interactions 
between and within companies in relationships over time. (Ford et al. 2003, p. 18) 
Supply network is a network of connected and interdependent organizations mutually 
and cooperatively working together to control, manage and improve the flow of material 
and information from suppliers to the end product that eventually create value to the end 
customer. Organizations in supply network are involved in the different processes and 
activities that produce value in the form of products and services. (Lysons & Farrington 
2006, p. 91-93) Firms are engaged in manufacturing and assembly of parts to create a 
finished product in supply network (Choi & Hong 2002, p. 469). Supply networks 
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considers complex relational patterns beyond the sphere of responsibility of a single 
firm where the relationships are governed by formal contracts as well as informal social 
ties (Choi & Dooley 2009). Supply networks are complex adaptive systems where firms 
together and independently try to fulfill demand and respond to changes in the 
environment and actions of counterparties (Pathak et al. 2007). The interaction with 
counterparties can be competitive or cooperative in nature. 
Supply network can be seen as an instance of a business network, which is depicted in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Business network. (Hansen et al. 1998) 
Networked parties have common interests to utilize each other’s resources by different 
activities in value creation processes. Supply network connects actors and their 
knowledge, abilities and skills to form a value network which refines products and 
services into added value items and services for end users as value adders in their 
purposes. 
2.1. Network connections 
A network model that is used as reference in this study is ARA model (see Figure 4).  
The actors, resources and activities (ARA) model (Håkansson & Johanson 1992) was a 
major step forward in conceptualizing business-to-business (B2B) relationships and 
networks. ARA model suggested mechanisms by which the entities relate to one another 
(see Figure 4). It proposed that three entities, actors, resources and activities captured 
the key aspects of interfirm (B2B) relationships and also within firms at all levels down 
to the relationships among individuals. Actors perform activities and control resources 
usually in combination with other actors. Actors are goal oriented and act to reach their 
goals which are transformed into more specific intentions. The value is created through 
the activities by which actors transform and transfer resources with a view to maintain 
and grow the more aggregated actor. Actors can be individuals or collectivities such as 
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groups, departments, organizations, or network of organizations. Resources can be 
tangible or intangible, stable or unstable, valuable or worthless depending on their 
configuration in the context. Activities can be of any kind and can take place at any 
level from the individual to the organizational networks. Actors have control over some 
resources and access to others resources to work with other actors to create, combine, 
develop, exchange, or destroy resources. (Lenney & Easton 2009) 
An activity can be transactional or relational. The activities can be seen from transaction 
cost economics (TCE) perspective in which the idea is to find a governance structure 
that generates the lowest transaction cost of running the system under specific and 
formal contracts. Relational activities, as social exchange, on the other hand are not 
specified as obligations, but rely on the idea that when one does another a favor, it will 
be rewarded in the future. A relational property trust for example is a key element in 
social capital (SC) and social exchange theory (SET) for the successful relational 
relationship. (Mäenpää 2013, pp. 53-57) 
 
Figure 4. ARA model (modified from Håkansson & Johanson 1992). 
According to Håkansson and Snehota (1995) the substance of a business relationship is 
easier to understand by looking at three aspects of it: actor bonds, resource ties and 
activity links. Refined ARA model introduced the concept of substance layers which 
binds together three original entities into actor bonds, resource ties and activity links. 
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Activity links as interlocking of behaviors provide the backbone of any organization or 
interorganizational relationships. Actors can be linked in many different ways and 
usually the intention is to set up pathways so that efficient operations are enabled in the 
network. Activity links may encompass many operational aspects such as design, 
production and logistics between two companies. Activity links develop over time and 
with repeated transactions. Resource ties connect various resource elements and can be 
entirely material as in the case of a production line consisting of a series of machines or 
entirely immaterial as in the case of the combinations of human knowledge and skills 
that result in the creation of a new product design. The mutual adaptation of resources 
forms resource ties between the companies in a relationship. Actor bonds connect actors 
and thus are primarily social in nature and involve perceptions, social cognitions, 
identity and affect. Bonds are created, nurtured and sometimes destroyed through 
interaction with other actors in the network. (Lenney & Easton 2009, pp. 553-554; Ford 
et al. 2003, pp. 39-40) 
Actors’ bond starts to build up from the first contact between them. In the beginning, 
there is considerable distance between actors in number of dimensions. Social distance 
measures the extent of actors’ unfamiliarity in other’s way of thinking, working and 
being at easy with. The degree to which the norms and values of two companies differ is 
measured by cultural distance. The difference and suitability between products, services 
and production technologies between the companies are measured with technological 
distance measure. Time distance refers to the fact that the business under discussion 
may actually take place far in the future (Lenney & Easton 2009, pp. 553-554; Ford et 
al. 2003, pp. 39-40) 
Interactions and activities are often complex, interdependent, interactive and 
continuously evolving to adjust to the changing environment, resulting in a network of 
relationships. Two-way communication is essential in enabling actors to become aware 
of each other and learn each other about what they stand for, what they expect from the 
relationship and what they can offer to it. Relationships vary depending on the actors 
need, willingness and ability to learn. It is long-term learning process to get to know 
counterpart about what they mean by things they say and the attitudes they show. (Ford 
et al. 2003, p. 39) Interactions between actors lead to the formation of relational assets 
and social attachment. This also has effect on the assessed values of relational properties 
of relationship. 
Structural capital is the configuration of linkages between people and business units 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998, p. 244). From the strategic network perspective, the firms 
with superior network structures, such as the central position (Wasserman & Faust 
1994) and structural holes (Burt 1992), exercise significant influence on access to 
resources, information, social capital brokerage and are well positioned to be aware of 
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changes in business environment and thus able to respond quickly (Zaheer & Bell 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2000). 
Value, capabilities and key resources are rarely created within one company, but co-
created among supply network actors based on competitive and collaborative 
relationships (Dyer & Singh 1998). Network as organizational form uses flexible, 
dynamic communication linkages to connect multiple organizations and people into new 
entities that can create products or services (Contractor et al. 2014). 
In order to take complex dynamics of relational networks into account one must look at 
beyond the traditional dyadic context. Olsen and Ellram (1997) proposed to focus more 
on network context relational dynamics studies of buyer-supplier-supplier triad. 
2.2. Network and triad connections 
Supply network consists of dyadic relationships. In order to capture the essence of a 
network the focus should be moved from dyad to triad as a unit of analysis. Dyadic ties 
are embedded in a triad. Triad perceives effects beyond dyadic relationships. 
A dyad consists of two nodes and a connecting link between the nodes. An example of a 
dyad is buyer-supplier relationship (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. A buyer-supplier dyad. 
In dyad, the main focus is on relationship (link) and how does it affect both connected 
business units (nodes).  
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In Figure 6, the dyadic relationships of supply network are depicted. The focal company 
has received an order from its customer C or O. 
 
Figure 6. Dyads in a supply network. 
As depicted in Figure 6, it is a common case in supply network that focal company (F) 
has many separate contractual dyadic relationships with its suppliers which are not 
cooperating with each other. Focal company as a customer delegates authority to the 
selected key suppliers (A, B, C, D, E and H) which become known as the direct first-tier 
suppliers in supply network (Cousins et al. 2008, p. 54). The focal company also has 
indirect so called second-tier suppliers (i, j, k, l, m and n) in the supply network. A first-
tier supplier is also the supplier that has a significant technical influence on the 
assembly even supplying indirectly (e.g. supplier n in Figure 6). In addition the focal 
company can have lower-tier (3rd, 4th, etc.) suppliers. (Lysons & Farrington 2006, p. 
139)  Middleman M is one of them. Companies are bounded by contracts and linked 
operationally across multiple tiers in a supply network (Pathak et al. 2014, p. 254). The 
input-transformation-output processes of supply network are run by the operations of 
supply network. The value creation and supplementary tasks are performed to produce 
ordered semi-fabricated products and to enable the final assembly of the end product, 
which as the final output is delivered to the customer. After all, the network level 
objective has been achieved. 
The companies continuously strive to achieve superior network positions. The network 
position dictates the access to the resources and makes the competitive advantage 
possible. (Madhavan et al. 2004, p. 921) To utilize opportunities and potential of 
business network an organization must act and cooperate in multiple relationships. In 
dyadic relationship consideration of external effects that come from wider business 
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network in which the dyad belongs to are excluded (Choi & Wu 2009, pp. 263-264). In 
addition the dyadic ties tend to be person to person or interpersonal. If disrupted, dyadic 
ties are difficult to restore because the offending issues are easily personalized. 
Idiosyncratic tendencies of individuals increase the risk of over boiling incidents, 
unpredictability and uncontrollability in work community. (Yoon et al. 2013, pp. 1457-
1465) 
A dyad makes no reference to how a link may affect another link, or a node affects 
multiple links that exist in a business unit’s sphere of influence. In order to take these 
effects into account a more sophisticated building block of a network is required. (Choi 
& Wu 2009, p. 10) Figuring out how a node and its links affect another link between 
neighbor nodes, a triad is required as the unit of analyses. 
A triad consists of three nodes and the possible ties between them (Madhavan et al. 
2004, p. 920). The triad is a core structure of higher-order networks (Wasserman & 
Faust 1994). An example of a triad is buyer-supplier-supplier relationship (see Figure 
7). 
 
Figure 7. A buyer-supplier-supplier triad. 
In buyer-supplier-supplier relationship buyer’s relationships have influence on the 
supplier-supplier relationship and vice versa. This indirect effect is not usually taken 
into account in dyadic analysis, in which the main focus is on how a node affect another 
node. The fact that the firms are embedded in a larger network is omitted in a dyadic 
framework. It focuses on the relations specific to a pair of firms. Ironically, a dyadic 
framework cannot fully account for the relational behaviors of the two firms involved in 
the dyad. The resource dependency between the firms may easily vary by the resource 
availability of the third firm for instance. Additionally, more than two firms are needed 
in order to understand how firms behave in a network. The object under scrutiny needs 
to be changed from dyad to triad for the network analysis purposes and to interpret the 
relational behavior of a firm more fully. For example, a triadic buyer-supplier-supplier 
relationship consideration will be imperative in order to understand the complex 
relationship interactions in supply networks. (Choi & Wu 2009b, p.10) 
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When buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier dyads are considered in isolation, they can 
be seen as two companies dealing only with one another. However, when the companies 
are brought together into a triad, each begins to see entirely different relational 
dynamics and meaning of dyadic engagement within the triad. In Figure 8, a few 
possible triadic relationships of the example focal company are depicted. 
 
 
Figure 8. Triads of focal company in a supply network. 
Here the focal company has triads T1 (FAB), T2 (FCD) and T3 (FEH). 
Suppliers A and B have non-contractual (loose/voluntary) relationship to mutual 
cooperation for triad’s good. The cooperation between suppliers in triad T1 may require 
some short of contractual agreement (as in the cases T2 and T3) or something a like to 
start with in order to get suppliers A and B to cooperate. A triad can facilitate and make 
the cooperation of its actors more efficient with the help of good governance. 
The triadic relationship and cooperation will certainly bring about benefits as well as 
challenges. It is more a network like collaboration with more possibilities and few 
optional configurations. Some of these issues of triad collected from literature are listed 
in the following Table 1. 
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Table 1. Effects that usually result from triadic relationship. 
Type of Effect Author 
Behavioral Generates less variability of behavior than dyads 
Generates behavioral convergences 
Generates more uniformity and convergence in exchange behavior 
Tend to constrain emotions 
Positive emotion or affect has a stronger impact on cohesion in dyads 
Reduce individuality 
Has higher levels of cohesion in the context of repeated exchange 
Greater sense of cohesion 
Uncertainty reduction has a stronger impact on cohesion in triads 
Exclusion introduces competition or conﬂict which may dampen the 
relational ties 
Adds sense of community 
Yoon et al. (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kohtamäki (2005) 
Structural Increases complexity 
Social interaction among the actors is interlinked, i.e. the higher the 
interaction between A and B, the lower between the B and C 
Not that easy to exchange ideas than in dyad 
Choi & Wu (2003) 
Havila et al.( 2004) 
 
Cousins et al. (2008) 
Resources Greater capacity to generate order and cohesion 
Can reduce resource and informational asymmetry between and 
among the actors 
Gain access to a particular resource 
Yoon et al. (2013) 
Madhavan et al.( 2004) 
 
Chi (1994) 
Economic Transitive triad aims to create value for all three partners   
Less cost transparency 
Risk and cost sharing 
Madhavan et al.( 2004) 
Cousins et al. (2008) 
Bartholomew (1997) 
 
In theorizing buyer-supplier-supplier relationships Choi and Wu (2009b) applied the 
balance theory from behavioral psychology, to evaluate the balance state of the actors 
whether two nodes have a positive, cooperative relationship or a negative, adversarial 
relationship. Typically, a plus (+) sign indicates a cooperative, voting power based 
relationship between two actors who are predicated on mutual trust and commitment 
(Krackhardt 1992; Morgan & Hunt 1994). A minus (-) sign indicates an adversarial, 
exit-based relationship that is caused by inequity and distrust between two actors 
(Johnston et al. 2004). Figure 9 depicts two examples of the balance states of triad.  
 
Figure 9. Balance state of triad ABC is indeterminate due to structural hole, whereas the triad DEF 
is in balance state. 
The undefined balance state of ABC triad could possibly be resolved and change to a 
balance state as in triad DEF by developing relational properties of the relationships. 
The overall characteristics of a dyad relationship are described either positive or 
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negative by plus (+) or minus (-) sign respectively. According to the balance theory, a 
balanced triadic relationship always has three plus signs or two minus signs and one 
plus sign. An unbalanced triadic relationship always has two plus signs and one minus 
sign or three minus signs. In an unbalanced triad actors try to address and resolve the 
relational inequity or mistrust until the triad is balanced. (Choi & Wu 2009b, p. 11) 
There are three balanced and three unbalanced triadic relationships. A balanced state 
offers a stable relational structure for the members of business units in the triad. 
Parties aiming for good cooperation usually pursue the high level of order and cohesion, 
uncertainty reduction, informational symmetry, conflict resolution and trust. All these 
are uneasy to implement in unbalanced triad. According to the balance theory individual 
actors in an unbalanced triad would try to address the relational inequity or mistrust that 
causes the unbalance in the triad until it is resolved and the triad becomes balanced. 
Therefore, as a general statement, an unbalanced triadic relationship tends to transform 
into a balanced state and the new relationship arrangement is often created sequentially 
(Heider et al. 1958). This characteristic predicts the relationship formation patterns and 
the nature of the new relationships. For example, in a three-ﬁrm triad ABC, it is likely 
that ﬁrms B and C become allies when they both already have a positive relationship 
with A (see Figure 9). In this case it is said that the positive relational position is 
‘transitive’ – B and C become allies based on the strength of their positive relationship 
with A (Heider et al. 1958; Choi & Wu 2009b, p. 11). Cf. transforming balance states in 
ABC to states as in DEF in Figure 9. 
A special type of triad occurs frequently in the supply network, wherein a buyer keeps 
suppliers apart in order to engage them in competition. In this unique triad, two nodes 
(e.g., two suppliers) are not connected directly, but indirectly through a third node (e.g., 
the buyer). This triadic arrangement is referred to as a structural hole (Burt 1992). In 
Figure 9 triad ABC depicts a structural hole. In such a triad, the structural hole between 
two disconnected nodes does not mean that the disconnected nodes are unaware of each 
other. It simply means that each of two nodes focuses on its own activities and it does 
not attend to the activities of the other. Actors on either side of a structural hole 
circulate in different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an opportunity for a 
broker to control the flow of information between actors and the projects that bring 
together actors from the opposite sides of the structural hole. (Burt 2000, p. 353)  
The missing direct link may indicate relational tension and competition between two 
actors (Choi et al. 2002). The state of a structural hole is neither balanced nor 
unbalanced (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 227). In a structural hole triad arrangement, 
the balance state is indeterminate. Certain tension is created in the structural hole 
arrangement and it is up to the members whether they have found equity and balance or 
not (Choi & Wu 2009b, pp. 11 - 13). 
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The power of actors in triad may differ. The stronger actor can control a weaker actor. 
Actors aspire to the leading position in order to be able to control two others. However, 
the strength of a triad is equal to the strength of the weakest actor. (Caplow 1968, p. 3)  
George Simmel (1950), a philosopher and sociologist, illustrated the underlying 
difference between a dyad and a triad by an example of a marriage relationship. When a 
man and a woman become a couple, they establish a dyadic relationship. Just when they 
feel they have established equilibrium in living together, a baby arrives. Each person in 
the man-woman dyad now has a new relationship with the baby, which affects and 
changes the relationship dynamics in the dyad between the man and the woman. 
Subsequent studies that were built on Simmel’s work pointed out that going from a 
dyad to a triad entails a quantum change. 
According to Madhavan et al. (2004) the firms engage in triadic ties for both 
competitive and cooperative reasons. To separate these distinct motives, they proposed 
the following constructs. Countering, which takes the competitive motive into account, 
is a formation of triads with the goal of reducing the value appropriated by a competitor. 
Clustering, which takes the cooperative motive into account, is the formation of triads 
with the goal of combining resources from multiple actors. Clustering is value-adder for 
all actors, whereas countering limits value creation while trying to nullify the extra 
value of appropriated by an actor. 
2.2.1. Types of triad 
Triad can be characterized by the type of triad structure, the roles of actors, the strength 
of relationships between actors and time period for the expected existence. Typically 
there is a focal actor having the central role in triad. In a triad structure focal actor can 
be located into a structural hole when it forms a bridge between two other disconnected 
actors, see Type I triad in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Triad structure types I, II and III (Peng et al. 2010). 
In Type II triad, the focal actor is in a peripheral position in triad where it is connected 
to one of the two other interconnected actors. In balanced structure, the focal actor is 
closest to be equal with the others. This Type III triad is called transitive or unitary 
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triad. (Peng et al. 2010, p. 400) Focal company has the bridge role in Type I, the 
peripheral role in Type II and the fully connected role in Type III triad (see Figure 10). 
In a transitive triad (type III) each actor has a direct link to the other two actors. 
Business units can form a transitive triad either as separate bipartite ties between each 
with no shared administrative structure in alliances or a three-way alliance with a shared 
administrative structure such as a consortium. (Madhavan et al. 2004, pp. 918-920) 
In unitary triad every actor interacts with each other actors in about the same extent (see 
Figure 11). Each actor acts as an intermediating actor between the other two actors. 
Strength of the relationships and number of the contacts in the relationship are fairly 
equal. 
 
Figure 11. Unitary triad. 
Each relationship has an influence on other relationships in triad. Actors have tendency 
to maintain the group as cooperating unit to achieve the common goals. (Holma 2009, p. 
33) 
In serial triad the intermediating actor establishes two dyadic business relationships to 
the other two actors one by one (see Figure 12). The dyadic exchange has an influence 
on the other dyad.  
 
Figure 12. Serial triad. 
There is loose or no connection at all between the peripheral actors. Intermediating actor 
has control over the serial triad and tasks, which are performed in predetermined order. 
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Intermediator’s position is defined in relation to the other two actors. (Holma 2009, pp. 
33-34) 
There is no direct connection between the peripheral actors in bridge triad (see Figure 
13). The third actor plays the role of a broker and such an arrangement is referred to as a 
structural hole (Burt 1992).  
 
Figure 13. Bridge triad. 
The intermediary and its tasks may bind the network actors together or provide a barrier 
between an actor and a network. (Holma 2009, pp. 34-35) 
Trimarchi (2001) introduced the plural triad in which the business actors from different 
culture are involved in both relational and exchange relationships.  
Actors of terminal triad prefer to operate independently, they do not cooperate 
voluntarily. In terminal triad, actors are aware of the fact that the triadic relationship has 
continuity in the future as has been in the past. The continuity is not necessarily related 
to actors’ wishes for the future. (Holma 2009, p. 35) 
Actors in continuous triad are related to each other for the time being defined by 
contractual terms or duration of the project for instance. Adaptation from actors is 
normally required to the certain extent in long-term triadic relationship. (Holma 2009, p. 
35) 
Episodic triad is established for a certain purpose and time period and dissolved at the 
end of it. Previous interactions affect the interactions during the episode and both affect 
the future interactions. (Holma 2009, p. 35) 
2.2.2. Triads in interfirm networks 
Triads can be formed in multiple ways and configurations. There is not a solution that 
fits all purposes. Forming triads is the subject of purpose and environment it belongs to. 
All triads are unique as all relations are. A certain type of triad fits better to a specific 
situation. The best triads are formed by the actors themselves based on the common 
view and needs. In interfirm network triads are not independent of each other 
(Wasserman & Pattison 1996; Madhavan et al. 2004, p 923). See next Section 2.2.3 for 
more about interconnectedness of relationships. 
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In the business networks a very common structure of triad is a buyer-supplier-supplier 
relationship where suppliers are not in a direct relationship with each other. As stated 
before, the triadic structure in which two nodes are not connected directly is referred to 
as the structural hole (Choi & Wu 2009b, pp. 11 - 15). A company in a structural hole 
position does not gain value by mediating subcontractors’ transactions (Uzzi & 
Gillespie 2002, p. 596). In such a case, it makes sense to consider about transforming 
from the bridge triad into a triad in which subcontractors have direct link to each other. 
However, as Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 598) noted that not all relations for all sets 
of actors have transitive tendencies. In fact, economic relations among business units as 
political relations among individuals in a large bureaucracy can certainly be intransitive 
rather than transitive. Sometimes it requires quite much effort and some replacement(s) 
perhaps before optimal triad has been formed. 
Geographic proximity is a significant factor in triad formation. Firms tend to form 
transitive triadic alliances with firms that belong to the same technology group 
(Madhavan et al. 2004, p 924). It is natural that certain cohesion among actors is 
required in forming a triad. This cohesion can be based on technology compatibility, 
long-term relationship, trust and other relational properties. 
2.2.3. Interconnectedness of relationships 
According to Håkansson and Snehota (2002) “every relationship is not only a bridge 
between two actors but also a reflector or a projection of other relationships.” 
Relationships may have an effect on other relationships in the network. This indirect, 
secondary or network function of relationships is called interconnectedness and it adds 
another dimension for analyzing relationships in business network. Interconnectedness 
is bidirectional by effect. The relationship AB has an effect on the relationship AC and 
vice versa (see Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. Interconnectedness of relationships in triad. 
The interconnectedness effect can be positive (+), negative (-) or neutral (no impact).  
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Interconnectedness does not exist when two relationships are totally independent from 
each other. (Ritter 2000, pp. 318 - 321) 
Relationships in networks do not exist independent from each other – they are 
interconnected because a relationship does affect beyond itself and the two actors 
involved in the dyad. Interconnectedness of relationship may also have either intentional 
or unintentional effect on and from other relationships. This has been called secondary, 
indirect or network function of relationships (Håkansson & Snehota 1995) that is 
interconnectedness. (Easton 1992) This interconnectedness is generic and is scaling up 
to the larger aggregates of network, even though the effectiveness usually diminishes 
along the extending scope. 
Ritter (2000) has identified ten different cases of interconnectedness in triad. The cases 
are, as he named them by effect, as follows: 
1. Neutrality effect - no interconnectedness between two relationships, which are 
totally independent from each other. 
2. Assistance effect - a one-sided positive effect between two relationships 
3. Hindrance effect - a one-sided negative effect between two relationships 
4. Synergy effect - a two-way positive effect between two relationships 
5. Lack effect - a positive and a negative impact coexist between two relationships 
6. Competition effect - a two-way negative effect between two relationships 
7. Unitary neutrality effect - three relationships just coexist with no impact on each 
other 
8. Initiation effect  - a focal company urges on relationship between subcontractors 
9. By-pass effect - a focal company deals directly with a customer and is passing 
by a retailer 
10. Hierarchy effect - a focal company forbids a direct contact between two other 
The following example of interconnectedness in Figure 15 includes some of these cases. 
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Figure 15. Improving an example triad state by positive interconnectedness. 
There is competition effect between AB-AC relationships, lack effect between AB-BC 
relationships and synergy effect between AC-BC relationships in the example state case 
in Figure 15. By developing business practices in AB-AC and AB-BC relationships the 
target state of maximizing the overall synergy in triad can be achieved. Here relational 
properties can have a significant role in improving the relationships and change the 
negative interconnectedness of relationships to positive. 
2.2.4. Triad governance 
Network governance is a set of mechanisms used for monitoring and controlling the 
behavior of one or a group of organizations with a view to protect the interest of 
shareholders and community members associated with the system (Provan & Kenis 
2007). Governance in its different forms is deployed to manage different tasks and 
network level objectives (Kilduff & Tsai 2003). 
According to Provan and Kenis (2007) there are three basic forms of governance: 
shared, lead, and network administered. In shared governance member companies 
together administer the network. Lead governance means that a lead organization 
manages the network through formal contracts. In network administered governance 
(NAO, for network administered organization) a separate administrative entity governs 
the member companies in the network. 
Kohtamäki (2005) divides governance of strategic networks into three different 
mechanisms: price, authority and social. In price governance mechanism the main idea 
is to support entrepreneurial based price competition for finding new opportunities and 
continuous improvement. The price governance is transaction cost economics based 
optimization case by case without long-term commitments to the relationships. This 
requires that there are several competing suppliers available on the market for the buyer. 
In authority governance mechanism, the key idea is that an actor in the network uses 
power over others. This requires that there is a dominant actor (lead company) which 
has bargaining power and power in general enough to utilize its authority. The lead 
company orchestrates in hierarchical network and the relationships are governed by 
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formal contracts. In social governance mechanism, the trust and sense of community are 
the bonding agents which help to reduce exchange costs and increase the collaborative 
learning and innovation. It is possible to get considerable cost savings and competitive 
advantage by utilizing trust as a substitute for formal control mechanisms in supply 
network (Laaksonen et al. 2008, p. 911). 
Interorganizational exchange governance often rests on either relational or transactional 
type of approach. Fast changing business contexts and contextual contingencies are not 
ideal conditions for practicing purely relational or transactional governance approach.  
Understanding the dynamic of key contextual factors and how they effect on 
organization’s resource capabilities and interorganizational power structure is crucial 
for identifying the best governance structure over time. (Mahapatra et al. 2010). 
Cooperative norms, defined as shared beliefs and expectations of cooperation between 
two parties, often establish the basis of relational ties between actors, and thus are part 
of relational capital (Cai et al. 2011, p. 2). Relational control in the form of norms or 
personal relations is often an effective practice of governance (Anderson & Narus, 1984 
& 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Relational governance can 
improve coordination and performance outcomes (Stephen & Coote 2007, p. 291). Triad 
partners have an option to utilize relationship-based governance as they have already 
adopted common norms and solid personal relations in process of time. 
A broker may choose to join the disconnected actors and enable direct link between 
them by relinquishing its power and control in exchange for synergy and self-
coordination in the triad. As the result of enacting this so called tertius iungens 
relational strategy the connectivity and level of cooperation increase within the triad 
(Obstfeld 2005). On the other hand the Klein’s (1989) research results of 338 export 
company study showed that will to control supply channels increased when relation 
specific investment, environmental uncertainty and transaction frequency increased. 
Governing triad gets easier when triad is in a balance state and the actors have a good 
relationship with each other. Next, the relationship is examined in triad context. 
2.3. Interorganizational relationship 
The most important function of the business relationship is to interlink the activities in 
an especial manner in order to help the actors transform resources in creation of optimal 
value (Håkansson & Johanson 1992). "Organizations are fundamentally relational 
entities" (O’Reilly 1991; Contractor et al. 2014). Relationship describes the pattern of 
interactions and mutual conditioning of behaviors between organizations over time. 
Time is the defining dimension of a relationship. Current behavior in a relationship 
reflects the past experiences and future expectations. (Ford et al. 2003, p. 38) 
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Interactions within relationships form the basis for companies to buy and sell products 
and services, to learn, to invest and take advantage of and acquire technology (Ford et 
al. 2003, p. 17). Customers and suppliers become better partners, co-producers and even 
co-developers if they interact more frequently. Quality, productivity and profitability are 
improved as a consequence of a good relationship. (Gummesson 2008, p. 279) The 
quality of relationships impacts a company’s business to a great extent. Creating and 
maintaining good quality relationships is really important especially in network 
business which has become very common in certain business domains in order to stay in 
competitive business. 
The essence of supplier’s relationship is the creation of commitment and trust between 
itself and customer with intent of establishing, developing and maintaining successful 
relational exchange. Mutual commitment is a desire to maintain a relationship which is 
often indicated by an ongoing investment into activities that are expected to maintain 
the relationship. Trust, also equated to reliability, in general is taken to mean acceptance 
of vulnerability to another’s possible, but not expected, ill will or lack of good will. 
(Morgan & Hunt 1994, p. 22) 
Commitment and trust are key components of a relationship because they encourage 
partners: 
1. to make investments into the relationship 
2. to resist taking advantage of alternatives which provide short-term benefits 
3. not to behave opportunistically with regard to the relationship 
 (Morgan & Hunt 1994, p. 22) 
Future of a relationship is not certain, relationship is indeterministic. It is changing all 
the time and it is determined by its history, current and the expectations of future events. 
Håkansson and Snehota (1995) have brought up a few more problematic issues like loss 
of control, resource demanding, preclusion from other opportunities and unexpected 
demands that may come up in a relationship. (Gemünden et al. 1997, p. 59) 
2.3.1. Buyer-supplier relationship 
In the literature, the dyadic buyer-supplier relationship has been characterized in terms 
of cooperative versus competitive relationships (Choi et al. 2002). The cooperative 
relationship emphasizes the explicitness and collaboration between a buyer and a 
supplier while the competitive relationship focuses more on the practice of information 
protection and arms-length relationship. Cooperative relationship leads the buyer and 
suppliers to consider each other as strategic partners, relationship specific investments, 
and work towards the common goals (Hahn et al. 1990). Wu and Choi (2005) separated 
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collaborative, professional, alliance, transactional, arms-length, adversarial and working 
relationship to capture the different characteristics of buyer-supplier relationships. 
While alliance and collaborative relationships imply close cooperation, shared vision 
and objectives between a buyer and a supplier, the arms-length and adversarial 
relationships are just the opposite. In the latter case the buyer’s major concern is price 
reduction which by default means that a supplier is selected based on the lowest price. A 
transactional or professional working relationship appears to be in the middle of 
collaboration-adversarial relationship continuum and supplier is replaced if the 
performance expectations are not met in these relationships. 
Buyer’s aim is to reduce supply risk. Buyer’s intention is to have more than only one 
source and that the suppliers are under the constant pressure of competition from other 
suppliers (Wu & Choi 2005). As each supplier is linked to many other business actors 
through a network of business relationships, it is obvious that inter-organizational 
relationships between organizations pose potential sources of risks for customer’s 
project business for example (Artto et al. 2008, p. 89). 
Buyer may want to be aware of network relationships beyond its direct supplier 
relationships. To do so it needs to identify the key companies the supplier is doing 
business with and the intensity of those relationships. The supply network tier analysis 
utilizing e.g. strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis is an 
option for doing this. Knowledge of supplier’s network and relationships could provide 
new opportunities to do business and strategically valuable information for forecasting 
the future performance of the supplier. (Choi & Kim 2008, pp. 9 - 10) 
Supplier-supplier relationship studies pointed out that a dyadic relational link between a 
buyer and a supplier operates differently when there are two or more competing 
suppliers involved in the relationship. (Wu & Choi 2005, pp. 28-29) Suppliers’ 
relationships have an influence on buyer’s relationships and vice versa. 
2.3.2. Supplier-supplier relationship 
Wu and Choi (2005) defined five supplier-supplier relationship archetypes. The 
conﬂicting archetype describes a supplier-supplier relationship where one supplier is 
willing to work with the other supplier, while the other supplier is not. The contracting 
archetype is characterized as a supplier-supplier relationship where two suppliers to the 
same buyer are in a relationship where one supplier is supplying to the other. The dog-
ﬁghting archetype describes suppliers which participate in a free market style, zero-sum 
game competition where minimal direct interaction takes place between them. The 
networking archetype collaborates willingly with the other suppliers to meet the buyer’s 
requirements. In the transacting archetype two suppliers maintain a pure professional 
working relationship to optimize the gains for each. 
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The supplier-supplier relationship is characterized by competition and cooperation 
which may take place simultaneously. Depending on the nature of the relationship the 
attitude and information sharing practices vary quite much. When the only target is to 
fulfill the minimum of contractual obligations, the level of cooperation easily remains 
low and the efforts made for developing the relationships and business practices are 
rare. (Wu & Choi 2005, p. 42 - 43) 
The competing suppliers are very reluctant to work together as Cross (1995) stated in 
his study of suppliers of British Petroleum. If suppliers do not supply the similar 
products or services and not offer similar capabilities, they are not direct competitors. 
This supplier-supplier relationship has more room for cooperation and flexibility for 
evolution that buyer may be looking for. Buyer can also affect and facilitate the 
cooperation between two suppliers. By doing so the suppliers seem to oblige and 
comply better (Wu et al. 2010, p. 120). 
When suppliers interact with each other in technical tasks, they exchange information 
explicitly. However, closely coupled suppliers were seen to exchange tacit information 
as well to boost their common operations. So, how much supplier can learn from and 
utilize the other supplier’s business processes and practices depends on the nature of the 
relationship, which on the other hand has great impact on mutual performance. For a 
cooperative supplier-supplier relationship, each has to be willing to see equity in the 
relationship. (Wu & Choi 2005, p. 42 - 43) 
2.3.3. Partnership unites triad actors 
According to Ploetner and Ehret (2006) a vertical partnership is a specific type of 
relationship based on mutual dependency and trust between actors, where both are 
committed to collaboration beyond a sequence of buying-selling transactions. 
Partnership relation aims for common benefits without abusing the other partner. 
Partnerships are quite common among the car manufacturers for example. In addition to 
partners standard supply collaboration they arrange joint training courses for employees 
and even engage in common advertising campaigns. Anderson and Narus (1990) 
perceived this as a special type of working partnership in which collaboration is based 
on the mutual recognition and understanding that the success of each firm depends on 
the other firm in part. Choosing the right suppliers is essential for developing the 
partnership relations. 
Standard criteria of quality, price and delivery are necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for assessing and selecting suppliers as long-term partners. Factors that 
determine long-term future performance and the potential for improvement and 
innovation need to be identified (Hamel & Prahalad 1994). Intangible relational issues 
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such as trust, commitment and openness are also involved in successful partnership. 
(Saunders 1997, p. 265) 
In order to establish a partnership all parties involved must demonstrate both the 
abilities and the motivation to cooperate in the partner relationship. Generally, 
companies will not engage in partnering relationship with companies that do not show 
the ability and motivation for fulfilling the objectives of the relationship. (Gemünden et 
al. 1997, pp. 99 - 107)  
The evolution of partnerships is a time consuming process (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
Partnership can evolve through positive common experiences and outcomes of the 
cooperation when quality, intensity and content of collaboration develop favorably over 
time. 
On the other hand, the companies are reluctant to partner with companies, that: 
a) are small relative to the company’s total demand 
b) are unimportant as a supplier or a customer 
c) are unreliable in fulfilling agreements 
d) lack innovative outlook 
e) have a generally low reputation 
Companies with low relational orientation are less likely to engage in partnering 
relationship. Lower relational orientation may stem from: 
f) inhibitive company policies 
g) transaction-based reward systems 
h) corporate belief systems 
i) rigid organizational structure 
j) restricted flows of communication 
(Gemünden et al. 1997, pp. 99 - 107) 
Partnerships are distinct from ordinary relationships. Partnership requires inter alia high 
level of trust, common norms, common vision for future benefits and restraint of 
partners from abusing powers. (Ploetner & Ehret 2006) 
Sustainable partnerships reside in a broad basis of personal interactions throughout all 
hierarchical levels and cooperating functions of the partner companies. This leads to an 
institutionalized form of collaboration, which can survive in spite of individual 
members leave organizations. Fliess and Becker (2006) suggested that informal modes 
of coordination gain importance compared to contractual coordination when 
collaboration becomes more intensive. Intense collaboration and trust are built on 
personal interaction. Therefore partnerships rely on a network of personal relationships 
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and social capital as value gained from the social network relationships. (Ploetner & 
Ehret 2006, p. 7) 
2.3.4. Relationship quality 
Relationship quality can be seen on two levels, relationship quality at interpersonal level 
among employees and relationship quality at inter-/organizational level e.g. between 
buyer and supplier organizations. The concept of relationship quality is a higher order 
construct consisting of several distinct but related components or dimensions: perceived 
service quality, trust, commitment and satisfaction (Rauyruen & Miller 2007, p. 22). 
Relationship quality includes measures of satisfaction, commitment and closeness 
(Crocker & Canevello 2010 p. 22). Researchers have found that relationship quality 
comprises trust, commitment and satisfaction (Moorman et al. 1992, Rauyruen & Miller 
2007). 
The quality of business relationship can be evaluated with relational measures. Buyer 
satisfaction is an important aspect of relationship quality and a significant predictor of 
the anticipated continuation of business relationships (Crosby et al. 1990). Relational 
properties are examined in the dedicated Chapter 3. 
 
Supply network business is based on the reliable supplier relationships and strategic 
supply network management. Choosing the right partners, actors doing business with, is 
very essential in order to get competitive advantage, add value of each in supply 
network and provided quality products and services for customers benefit. Effective 
utilization of resources and capabilities requires cooperation with capable suppliers in 
supply network. Supply network makes it possible to do things in parallel and shorten 
lead times, and in addition it gives flexibility to better adapt to the changes in the whole 
business environment. Supply network can be utilized and managed better with 
composed triads, larger cohesive units, which each has shared objectives and benefits, 
trust based governance in first place and sense of community. Being in the same boat 
and having the same chart help along the voyage to get everyone to the same port of 
destination. Relational compatibility between the actors is required for a long-term well-
functioning relationship. Relational properties have influence on relationship quality. 
Trust is the first requirement in forming and developing triadic relationship among 
actors. Actors in triad are seeking the relationship quality and benefits. Relational 
properties have essential role in triad forming and achieving the state of balance in triad. 
The next Chapter 3 introduces the relational properties on theory perspective. 
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3. RELATIONAL PROPERTIES 
Relational properties concern matters that are reflecting and affecting relationship(s) 
between two or more interrelated actors. A relationship can be characterized in part by 
relational properties. Relational properties are many and they differ from each other by 
nature and scale. Essential relational properties and related sub-features are listed in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Relational properties examined in this study. 
Relational 
properties 
  
including 
  
abbr. 
 
Author 
Trust Reputation, former experiences, mutuality, 
solidarity, role integrity, monitoring 
behavior, uncertainty, risk, organizational 
culture and norms 
T 
Ivens 2006 
Commitment Dependency, importance, motivation, 
attitude, loyalty 
Com 
Ivens 2006 
Collaboration Longevity, regularity, intensity, information 
exchange, flexibility, satisfaction, relational 
planning, routinization, content, formality, 
adaptability, transparency, conflict 
resolution 
Col 
Gummesson 
2008 
Relational 
Behavior 
Initiating Behavior  
Signaling Behavior  
Disclosing Behavior  
Interaction Frequency 
Closeness & face-to-face proportion 
Distribution 
 Lateral Involvement  
 Vertical Involvement 
Attraction 
Personal and social properties 
R 
Leuthesser 
1997 
Leuthesser & 
Kohli 1995 
Gummesson 
2008 
Power Restrain in use of power, bargaining 
power, adaptation, acquiescence, 
constraints, empowerment 
P 
Gummesson 
2008 
 
Relational properties are embedded in social capital, which makes it possible to achieve 
something that cannot be achieved without it in social exchange process in business 
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context as well. Therefore, the relational properties of a relationship must be at good 
enough level to form and develop a well-functioning triadic relationship in the purpose 
of becoming the integrated part of the key partner supply network. In triad context 
control and governance are easier to implement and manage when relational properties 
are in a good state. This in turn allows reducing the amount of effort and resources in 
the controlling and monitoring tasks and activities within a triad. 
The need for relational practice development can be evaluated by measuring and 
analyzing these relational properties. In the following sections relational properties in 
Table 2 and the interrelated social capital and social exchange are presented based on 
theory from the literature review. 
3.1. Trust in interfirm relationship 
Trust exists when one party has confidence in an exchange partner's reliability and 
integrity (Morgan & Hunt 1994, p. 23). Trust refers to the expectation that both actors 
will behave in a mutually acceptable manner and neither party will exploit the other's 
vulnerabilities (Sako & Helper 1998, p. 388). Trust lubricates collaboration and 
collaboration itself breeds trust (Nahapiet & Sumantra 1998, p. 225). 
Trust can be investigated at two different levels depending on the object of trust. At 
interpersonal level, the object of trust is the member of the partner organization while 
the partner organization itself is the object at interfirm level investigation. (Laaksonen et 
al. 2008, p. 911) Some other underlying dimensions of trust that scholars have brought 
up are for example the differentiation between personal characteristics and 
organizational capabilities, and occurring in cognitive and affect-based forms of trust. 
The former originates from reliable role performance, cultural-ethnic similarity, and 
professional credentials, while the latter is a function of organizational citizenship 
behavior and interaction frequency. Both of these forms of trust were found to enhance 
coordination between counterparties by reducing administrative costs. (Handfield & 
Bechtel 2002, p. 372) 
Moorman et al. (1993, p. 93) research results indicate that trust would be more a 
function of interpersonal factors than of individual factors, i.e. trust can be seen as a 
relational property. The literature indicates that there is a strong relational element in 
trust  (Mayer et al. 1995; Young & Wilkinson 1989; Havila et al. 2004). 
According to Young and Wilkinson (1989, p. 120) trust in business relationships is 
based on the overall relationship rather than on the particular episodes of behavior or 
particular people involved in the relationship. 
Laaksonen et al. (2008) distinguish three types of trust: contractual, competence, and 
goodwill. These are described in Table 3. Usually each of these forms of trust is present 
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in an interfirm relationship and is developing over time. The more the mutual trust 
develops the less probable is actor’s opportunistic behavior and goal conflict. At the 
same time the predictability of actor's behavior increases leading to the lower 
transaction costs.  Interorganizational trust enables smooth and ease negotiation 
processes and thereby reduce the transaction costs of interfirm exchange (Zaheer et al. 
1998). 
Table 3. Conditions conducive to the emergence of contractual, competence, and goodwill trust in 
customer-supplier relationships (Laaksonen et al. 2008) 
Type of trust Conditions conductive to the emergence of trust Author 
Contractual 
trust 
Reliance on oral agreements 
Contracting costs are avoided 
Legal sanctions like non-disclosure agreements are not 
used 
Sako (1992) 
Dyer and Singh (1998) 
Gulati and Singh (1998) 
Pisano (1990) 
Competence 
trust 
Good and competent reputation 
Consistent deliveries of high quality products in a timely 
accurate manner 
Transaction specific investments and commitment 
 
Repeated interaction 
Minor use of formal output controls 
Barney and Hansen (1994) 
Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer (2000) 
Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) 
Sako (1992) 
Suh and Kwon (2006) 
Gulati (1995) 
Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) 
Das and Teng (2001) 
Goodwill 
trust 
Cooperative supplier management practices: avoiding 
competitive bidding, supplier selection based on 
competence rather than price 
Decentralization of decision making 
The fairness of the relationship: risk sharing and profit 
distribution agreements 
Sharing of valuable information 
Long-term projected length of trading 
Sako and Helper (1998) 
 
 
Sako (1992) 
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) 
 
Das and Teng (1998a) 
Jarillo (1988) 
Dyer and Chu (2003) 
 
Utilizing trust as a substitute for formal control mechanisms significant cost savings and 
possible competitive advantage can be achieved in a good interfirm relationship. 
(Laaksonen et al. 2008, p. 911) 
Counterpart’s relationship investments affect trust. Trust increases the propensity to 
invest in the relationship (Havila et al. 2004). Relationship investment increases trust 
and trust in turn increases probability to relationship investments. Investments in 
supplier relationships are done to minimize risk, involving activities traditionally 
considered the exclusive domain of the other party. Investments in relationship usually 
lead to significant increase in the quality and duration of relationships, which in turn 
increases the likelihood to make greater mutual investments in future transactions. So, 
in this regard, trust inevitably requires some sense of mutuality and reciprocal loyalty. 
(Handfield & Bechtel 2002) 
Trust is indispensable in social relationships as it allows social interactions to proceed in 
a simple and confidential manner. Although trust exists between the actors, there is 
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always a potential risk that an actor may behave in a way that is not desirable for the 
relationship.  The critical aspects of trust in a relationship concern the actor’s belief that 
the counterpart’s actions will result in positive outcomes for the actor. In empirical 
studies a positive direct or indirect link from communication to trust has been found. 
(Havila et al. 2004, Anderson & Narus 1990, Morgan & Hunt 1994) Trust among actors 
in interorganizational relationships improves communication and dialogue and can be 
foundation for creating common strategic visions. (Heide & John 1990; Handfield & 
Bechtel 2002) 
Trust is the foundation for a relationship to start cooperation and build commitment to 
long-term partnership. Like in high-rise building the solid foundation is must (as is trust 
in business) in order to reach the top floor and withstand the environmental impacts. 
3.2. Commitment in interfirm relationship 
Commitment is broadly defined as the strength of an attachment to another social unit 
such as a group, organization, or community (Kanter 1968). Commitment to the 
relationship is defined as an enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship 
indefinitely (Moorman et al. 1992, p. 316). Commitment can be seen as a behavioral 
concept that captures a dynamic element in the relationship. Strong commitment paves 
the way to the further investments and continuation of relationship (Havila et al. 2004). 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 23) define commitment as an exchange partner believing 
that an ongoing relationship with another is so important that it warrants maximum 
effort at maintaining it i.e. the committed party believes the relationship is worth 
working on and ensuring it in future. In this definition, three core aspects are expression 
of value judgment, aim to preserve the relationship by stabilizing it and that 
commitment stems from an effective silent agreement and a sense of honor which goes 
beyond the current expected utility of exchange (Ivens 2004, p. 302). Krause et al. 
(2007) found that commitment between the two firms is an important complementary 
condition to establish performance goals and to provide added value to buyer via social 
capital accumulation with suppliers. 
Many studies have shown that communication is one antecedent to commitment. 
Anderson & Weitz (1992) showed that past communication between the actors affected 
to relationship commitment. According to Halinen (1997) strong personal relationships 
and intensive interorganizational contacts are important factor prior to commitment. 
Long-term orientation and solidarity affect positively actors’ mutual commitment, 
which in turn furthers collaboration substantially. 
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3.3. Interfirm collaboration 
Collaboration literally means working together to a common aim that individuals or 
organizations are set. Collaboration is a way forward for organizations in situations in 
which working alone would mean failure to achieve the desired ends. (Huxham 1997) 
Most definitions of collaboration are based on the following assumptions (Bititci et al. 
2004). 
Collaboration is: 
 taken to imply a very positive form of working in association with others for 
some form of mutual benefit (Huxham 1997). 
 a distinct mode of organizing implies a positive, purposeful relationship between 
organizations that retain autonomy, integrity and distinct identity, and thus, the 
potential to withdraw from the relationship (Huxham 1997). 
 a number of companies linked to create and support a service or product for its 
service life including final disposal (Jordan and Michel 2000). 
 a focus on joint planning, coordination and process integration between supplier, 
customers and others partners in a supply network. Also involves strategic joint 
decision making about partnership and network design (McLaren et al. 2000). 
 a process in which organizations exchange information, alter activities, share 
resources and enhance each other’s capacity for mutual benefit and a common 
purpose by sharing risks, responsibilities and rewards (Himmelman 1992). 
Collaboration reflects collaborative culture, joint planning, resource sharing, joint 
problem solving and performance measurement (Kumar 2012, p. 909). Collaboration 
with external partner has become an important part of business practice for companies 
to enhance their capabilities. The number of interfirm collaborations has increased 
substantially over the past decades and collaborations have become a central component 
in many companies’ strategy (Lavie 2007; Pulles et al. 2014) Some resources and skills 
are better to acquire through collaboration with actors specialized to the subject. When 
organization cannot gain advantage from performing certain activities internally, it can 
access complementary capabilities from external providers in supply network (McIvor 
2009, p. 47). 
Supplier's collaborative attitude and the buyer-supplier relational characteristics on 
buyer-supplier relationships explain an important part of a supplier's higher than the 
average contribution to buyer innovation (Pulles et al. 2014). 
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Some motives and benefits that can be achieved by collaboration are presented in the 
following Table 4. 
Table 4. Collaborational motives and benefits.  (Bititci et al. 2004) 
Scope Motive or Benefit Author 
Asset management, 
quality and 
competence 
Increase asset utilization 
Increase quality of product 
Enhance skill and knowledge 
Lewis (1990) 
 
 
Performance 
improvement 
Share and reduce the cost of product development 
 
 
Enhance customer service – reduction in lead times, 
customer complaints, etc. 
Reduce time in product development 
 
 
Have technological gain as participating firm 
Lewis (1990),  Parker  (2000), 
Horvath (2001), McLaren et 
al. (2000)  
Lewis (1990) 
 
Lewis (1990),  Parker  (2000),  
McCarthy and Golicic (2002), 
McLaren et al. (2000)  
Lewis (1990), Parker  (2000) 
Risk management Decrease risk of failure of product development  
Reduce inventory – in the face of increasing 
technological complexity and rapid rate product 
development and obsolescence 
Parker  (2000) 
Parke, (2000), Holton (2001) 
 
Market share and 
access 
Increase their market share 
Gain rapid access to markets 
 
Achieve economies of scale in production 
Lewis (1990) 
McCarthy and Golicic (2002), 
Parker  (2000) 
Lewis (1990) 
 
Collaboration can be continuous or based on a deal for a certain period. There is relation 
between collaboration and competition. In situation of low degree of competition the 
collaboration has more space to evolve. High degree of collaboration combined with 
low degree of competition provides a good base for a long-term harmonious 
relationship. (Gummesson 2008, p. 30) 
3.4. Relational behavior in business context 
Leuthesser and Kohli (1995) found at least three important aspects of relational 
behavior from literature review of group theory, marketing and organization behavior. 
The first aspect relates to the type of information a supplier obtains from and provides 
to a buyer. Behaviors that appear to be central in this respect are initiating, signaling, 
and disclosing behaviors. The second aspect of relational behavior relates to the 
frequency of interaction and the richness of the medium of that interaction. The third 
aspect of relational behavior indicates the extent of lateral and vertical involvement in 
interactions between organizations’ functions and hierarchical levels. (Leuthesser & 
Kohli 1995, pp. 221-222) 
Supplier’s relational behavior and relational properties in general have impact on 
buyer’s satisfaction and continuity of business relationship. In Figure 16, these relations 
are depicted. 
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Figure 16. Relational behaviors and their consequences (modified from Leuthesser & Kohli 1995). 
Relational properties can be seen as a foundation for a business relationship and 
relational behavior part as an apparatus to uphold customer’s satisfaction at continuous 
relationship. In relational skills the both relational behavior and properties are taken into 
account. The better the relational skills an actor has the better the aspects of relationship 
are taken into account with continuous desire to improve the relationships. The elements 
of relational behavior are presented next. 
Initiating behavior refers to a supplier’s proactivity to initiate efforts in order to better 
understand a buyer’s needs and requirements and help in increasing buyer’s 
competitiveness. Initiating behavior is likely to send a positive signal to the buyer about 
the supplier’s genuine will to learn the buyer’s business and supplier’s motivation to 
perform in the buyer’s interests. (Leuthesser & Kohli 1995, p. 222) 
Signaling behavior refers to a supplier’s manner to inform a buyer about the intended 
changes in advance. Signaling behavior helps a buyer to look ahead to modify plans if 
necessary and avoid unpleasant surprises. Giving advance notice of impending changes 
is likely to engender greater satisfaction with the supplier. (Leuthesser & Kohli 1995, p. 
223) 
The extent to which a supplier is perceived to provide sensitive information about itself 
is referred as disclosing behavior.  Disclosure of sensitive information places the giver 
at a potential risk and implies trust towards receiver to not misuse the information. 
(Leuthesser & Kohli 1995, p. 223) 
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Interaction frequency indicates activity in information exchange and sharing, which in 
turn affects directly to the level of uncertainty and ambiguity. Higher interaction 
frequency reduces the uncertainty and ambiguity. This is also likely to lead to greater 
buyer’s satisfaction when supplier understands and better meets to buyer’s needs and 
thus increases relationship quality as well. (Leuthesser & Kohli 1995, p. 223) 
Face-to-face proportion of total interaction between a supplier and a buyer defines the 
richness of relational behavior. In face-to-face interaction additional information about 
voice inflection, facial expression and other non-verbal clues are available for more 
accurate mutual interpretation and understanding. (Leuthesser & Kohli 1995, p. 223) 
Distribution of interaction can be observed from lateral and vertical involvement 
perspectives. Lateral involvement measures interactions in different functions between 
buyer and supplier.  Counterparty members are directly in touch and therefore get first-
hand information without distortion that passing through a detour may cause. Achieved 
accuracy in understanding the requirements and need for coordination of supplier’s 
activities increase customer’s satisfaction.  Vertical involvement measures the extent in 
which a buyer’s interactions are distributed across different hierarchy levels within a 
supplier organization. Trust and satisfaction are enhanced in a group when a greater 
number of individuals are engaged in ongoing interaction. (Leuthesser & Kohli 1995, 
pp. 223-224) 
Personal and social properties like age, gender, profession, education, ethnicity, 
personality type and personal traits have impact on relationships in social business 
networks for example in formation of patterns of relationships like cliques, clusters and 
blocks. Charm, charisma, good impression and chemistry are examples of recognizable 
properties that have a great effect on personal as well as on business relationships. 
(Gummesson 2008, p. 35) Personal similarity has more positive effect on relationship 
when the level of dependence is low, whereas the effect diminishes when the level of 
dependence increases (Biong & Selnes 1995, p.492). 
Harris et al. (2003) define attraction as the extent to which relational partners perceive 
past, current, future or potential partners as professionally appealing in terms of their 
ability to provide superior economic benefits, access to important resources and social 
compatibility. Attraction between companies may require a combination of rational 
financial motives and psychological factors. A parasocial relationship – relationship to 
brands and objects – do not only exist with people, but also with objects and mental 
images – symbols – such as brands and corporate identities. (Gummesson 2008, pp. 33-
38) Attraction has a motivating role in business relationship development (Harris et al. 
2003). In each case a certain amount of attraction is a necessary precondition for the 
commencement of interaction, while current attraction determines whether parties are 
motivated to maintain their relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
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3.5. Power in business network 
Dahl's (1957, p. 202) classic definition of power: A has power over B to the extent that 
A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. This definition implicitly 
assumes that B is unable to escape from the relationship. (Olsen et al. 2014, p. 2580) 
Power has long been recognized as an essential property of interaction in business 
networks (Olsen et al. 2014, p. 2579). Emerson (1962) view power as stemming from 
the relational arrangements of entities in network-like contexts. Networked power is 
actors’ attempts to utilize their current position in a multi-actor network to allocate and 
decouple actors, resources and activities according to their own benefit (Olsen et al. 
2014, p. 2580). An actor’s relations with other actors, over whom it has some power, 
determine its network position in the network. The direct and indirect relations form 
part of an actor’s power base, through its ability to access and control to some extent the 
resources of other actors in the network (Mattson & Johanson 1992). Actor’s power is 
therefore inherently relational and derived from an actor’s position which Thorelli 
(1986, p. 40) called also as ‘a location of power’. This ‘positional’ power is also 
normative meaning that actors can exert influence over others through shared values and 
expectations, which can be seen as a special type of legitimate base of power. (Welch & 
Wilkinson 2005, p. 206) 
Rarely each party has the same amount of power in a relationship. In an asymmetrical 
relationship, the weaker party may feel used, but keeps the relationship functioning 
because there is not better alternative. If the relationship is unfair, the weaker party is 
likely to seek opportunity to exit. (Gummesson 2008, pp. 30-31)  
The level of actor’s discretionary control over the critical resource explains the relative 
distribution of power. Asymmetric dependence leads to power imbalance and advantage 
to a specific actor which may limit the autonomy and constrain the behavior of the other 
actor. (Mahapatra et al. 2010, p. 539) The more power an organization has, the more it 
can influence on the nature of the interorganizational exchange, the form of the 
interaction and the ratio of exchange (Cook 1977, p. 66). Power is better to exercise in 
ways that empower rather than disempower others in a triad which is aiming balance 
and cooperative state, and the common benefits. 
3.6. Social capital as relational factors’ aggregate 
Social Capital Theory (SCT) gained popularity in the 1990s by directing attention to 
company’s social network as a source of competitive advantage (Baker 1990, Burt 
1997; Roden & Lawson 2014, p. 90). According to Dyer & Singh (1998), firms can 
leverage advantage in their social relationships by moving away from arm's-length 
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exchanges and focusing on specific investments, knowledge exchange, complementary 
competencies, and more effective governance mechanisms. 
Social capital exists in the social networks of actors (Burt 1997). Related construct 
which is applied to an inter-organizational context is relational capital. Relational 
capital is defined as a form of social capital embedded in a single business relationship. 
It consists of dimensions such as trust, open interaction, and a feeling of shared destiny 
(Chang & Gotcher 2007). Relational capital decreases transaction costs (Sako 1992), 
and increases relationship commitment (Morgan & Hunt 1994). 
Social capital is a valuable asset that originates from access to resources made available 
through social relationships (Granovetter 1992). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) proposed 
three dimensions of social capital: structural, cognitive, and relational. According to 
them, the structural dimension is related to social capital resulting from the structural 
configuration, diversity, centrality and boundary-spanning roles of network participants. 
The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to the resources that provide shared 
representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning to the parties e.g. the shared 
goals, norms, vision and values between actors (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998). The relational 
dimension refers to actor’s relationships that develop through a history of interactions to 
the extent to which trust, obligation and reciprocity exist between actors (Krause et al. 
2007). As can be noticed the relational dimension of social capital and relational 
properties are very interrelated and deal with the same matters which affect relationship 
quality. 
Actors have financial, human and social capital which is generated from their position 
in the social structure. These different capitals are the resources actors have at their 
disposal to maximize their utility at network. Financial capital is owned by an actor in 
the form of money or other property. Human capital is a combination of natural 
qualities, like charm, health or intelligence and skills that have been acquired in the 
formal education and practical training. In contrast to the other forms of capital, social 
capital is the content of relationships among actors. Actors cannot possess the property 
rights to social capital alone like in the case of financial and human capital. Related 
actors possess social capital mutually until actors finish with each other and the related 
social capital vanishes (Burt 1992, pp. 8-9). Supply network consists of multiple 
relationships and thus also of social capital. According to Burt, networks can be viewed 
on different levels: 1) networks of individuals, 2) networks of subgroups, or 3) different 
subgroups as a structured system. These levels of aggregation can be characterized by a 
relational dimension and a positional dimension of network. (Häuberer 2011, pp. 88-89) 
According to Coleman (1990, p. 302) a special feature of social capital is its form that 
inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors unlike the other 
forms of capital. This also means that social capital has the characteristic of being 
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inalienable (Loury 1987) and a public good since it is not a private good for any 
embedded actors (Coleman 1990).  
Unlike  the  way  physical  capital  is  created  by  processing  materials  into  half-
finished products and tools for production, and the way human capital is created by 
learning  new skills and enhancing capabilities,  social  capital  arises through  changes  
in  relations among people who enable action. Hence social capital exists in relations 
and is less tangible than physical or human capital. Social capital is shared by nature. 
Coleman (1990) states that when investing actors gain benefits from social capital, also 
other actors involved in the social structure benefit. (Häuberer 2011, p. 40)  
Closure and stability are factors which influence social capital as a whole. Social 
structures comprise different levels of closure. A social structure is closed if relations 
exist between all associated actors. Closure affects access to information (Coleman 
1990, p. 310). Those actors with dense networks have higher amount of social capital at 
their disposal than actors with sparse networks. Social capital depends on the stability of 
the social structure and the relations. Disruption in social organization or social relations 
destroys social capital. Coleman (1990) points out the benefit that network closure 
facilitates sanctions and thus makes it less risky for actors in the network to trust one 
another.  Like physical or human capital also social capital loses value over time. Social 
relations fragment, expectations and obligations loose importance, connections erode 
and norms expire. Like physical and human capital social capital requires maintenance 
to remain productive. (Häuberer 2011, pp. 41-42; Lesser 2000, p. 8) 
The central proposition of social capital theory is that networks of relationships 
constitute a valuable resource for the conduct of social affairs, providing their members 
collectively owned capital – a credential – which entitles them to credit, in the various 
senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986, p. 249). Much of social capital is embedded in 
networks of mutual acquaintance and recognition. (Nahapiet & Sumantra 1998, p. 243) 
Relational embeddedness describes the kind of personal relationships people have 
developed with each other through a history of interactions (Granovetter 1992). It 
focuses on the particular relations people have, such as respect and friendship, that 
influence their behavior. People fulfill such social motives as sociability, approval, and 
prestige through these ongoing personal relationships. (Nahapiet & Sumantra 1998, p. 
224) Social capital forms in social exchange. 
3.7. Social exchange 
The core explanatory mechanism of social exchange theory (SET) is the relational 
interdependence, or relational contract, that develops over time through the interactions 
of the exchange partners (cf. Dwyer et al. 1987). In relationship development the social 
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contact pattern between the exchanging actors is a critical element (Cunningham and 
Turnbull, 1982). As SET focuses on the relationship between the exchange parties as 
the governance mechanism of exchange, it is especially useful for explaining B2B 
relational exchange (cf. Anderson & Narus 1990; Dwyer et al. 1987). Increasing trust 
and commitment are consequences of social exchange process in the relationship, in 
which the weak initial unilateral dependence of one of the actors is transformed into a 
growing mutual interdependence (cf. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Social exchange is based 
on unspecific duties instead of the formal contracts and related exact quantities in 
transaction based economic exchange (Mäenpää 2013, pp. 56-57). Relationships evolve 
through a social exchange process in which the actors develop their relationship in 
interactive sequences (Anderson & Narus 1990; Dwyer et al. 1987; Morgan & Hunt 
1994). One actor takes the initiative to do business with the counterpart actor by 
investing resources in bilateral business. To the extent that the counterpart responds, the 
interaction evolves sequentially and the actors’ mutual commitment increases in these 
development increments, which in part allows cooperation in the future. 
The idea behind and motivation for social exchange is a kind of reciprocity rule i.e. 
when one does a favor to another, the one expects a reward in return. Cropanzano and 
Mitchell (2005) stated it smartly: “Social exchange comprises actions contingent on the 
rewarding reactions of others, which over time provide for mutually and rewarding 
transactions and relationships”. 
 
Summarizing this chapter shortly based on the relation of content to triad forming and 
developing follows next. Social capital increases in social exchange and social exchange 
increases in the transitive and unitary triads. Relational properties are inevitably 
affecting in forming and developing triad and how well it is working. Trust is required 
in intrafirm commitment to collaboration. Appropriate and decent relational behavior is 
expected for keeping triad operations running well. The rules of use of power should be 
agreed together. Awareness of common rules and the fair play let actors focus on the 
real business objectives and good cooperation to achieve these together without 
unnecessary tensions. Social capital including the relational properties requires 
maintenance to remain productive. Actors must pay attention to customer relation 
management (CRM) and make sure that the level of each relational property is 
satisfactory among triad actors and relational factors are not preventing good co-
operation and results. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
MATERIAL 
In this chapter, the empirical research context and the methods of data collection and 
analysis are described. The unit of analysis is triad and focus of research is on relational 
properties. This thesis approaches relational issues in interfirm relationship context by 
qualitative case study methods such as the survey and interviews. The distinctive need 
for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. The 
conceptual-analytical approach is applied to the theory examinations of the central 
concepts of the study. 
4.1. Research methods 
The case study research method was selected due to the suitability for empirical 
research and empirical data collection in the case environment. The case study method 
allows investigators to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events 
such as small group behavior, organizational and managerial processes and relations 
(Yin 2009, p. 4). 
Based on the literature review on the subject the business/supply network elements and 
related framework for the case study was established and relational properties selected 
for the survey. Relational measures were selected for getting findings in trust, 
collaboration, commitment, behavior and power areas. These key relational properties 
have immense effect on the relationships in triad and therefore measuring them is vital 
to find the current shortcomings and related development ideas for triadic relationships. 
Brief theory part is presented for each essential element involved in research 
framework. Based on used theory the sufficient operational set of measures were tried to 
achieve with the set of created questions for the survey.  Empirical data collection of the 
selected relational properties took place in the interviews during the survey. The data 
analysis and derived results reflect presented theory. 
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4.2. Case study research process 
Case study research is linear but iterative process which consists of several phases (see 
Figure 17).(Yin 2009) 
 
Figure 17. Case study process. (Yin 2009) 
In planning phase research questions are identified and suitability of case study research 
method is ascertained by understanding its strengths and limitations among other things. 
Research process started with literature review of topics under investigation. Relational 
theme was selected and related literature review done in planning phase of the case 
study. Preliminary knowledge of triads, business relationships and relational properties 
were gained in early literature review phase. Literature review was a continuous process 
during the thesis work and led to select the relational properties studied in considered 
case triads and theory framework used in the thesis. 
In designing phase the unit of analysis and case(s) to be studied are defined. Theory, 
propositions, if any and the issues underlying the anticipated study are developed and 
the case study design is identified. Procedures to maintain case study quality, e.g. the 
criteria for interpreting the findings, need to be defined. Triad was defined as the unit of 
analysis in this case study. The appropriate questionnaire and versatile questions of 
relational themes were created for the empirical data collection purpose. 
In preparing phase case study protocol is developed, case study investigator’s skills are 
honed and training with required material done for ensuring adequate results in data 
collection phase. The questionnaire was fine-tuned in order to get written notes entering 
quick and easy. Voice-recording functionality was ensured. Schedule of interviews was 
set and interview places were agreed. 
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In data collecting phase the case study protocol is followed and data collected about 
actual human events and behavior using multiple sources and appropriate methods to 
maintain the chain of evidence. The data collection took place in interviews. The same 
questions were asked from both parties in dyadic relationship, currently and in triad 
context, to increase the validity and reliability of answers by multiple sources. 
In analyzing phase an overall analytic strategy is needed. It relies on the theoretical 
framework described and uses quantitative or qualitative data or both preferably with 
analytic techniques.  Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, 
testing, or by other means recombining evidence in order to draw conclusions from 
empirical data. Data is displayed apart from interpretations and rival explanations are 
explored. Quantified data was analyzed with Excel application. Quantitative data were 
examined and categorized. Conclusions were drawn and research questions were 
answered. 
In sharing phase audience is defined to whom textual and visual materials are 
composed with enough evidence for reader to make his or her own conclusions. 
Preliminary and summary results were delivered to and presented in meeting with 
representatives of the focal company. The final report is this thesis. 
4.3. Case selection 
The case was selected based on the objectives of both Rebus project and the focal 
company. The focal company wanted to develop business practices in its supply 
network to be able to achieve better coordination of support services in changing 
situations and thus avoid the unnecessary waiting times and conflict situations in 
production. A network business model could be a solution for this and in addition it was 
on the focus of Rebus research project at the same time. Therefore, in this thesis the 
triadic network business model was selected and examined as a possible solution to 
achieve the common objectives in the relational network business research and 
development. 
The focal company selected six key suppliers to participate in this case study. The case 
study was done for these suppliers and related functions in the focal company. The focal 
company proposed the following case study context (F, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 and SS) 
included in Figure 18 as a part of an imaginary supply network. The focal company’s 
customer O and supplier M are not part of this case study as is the case with the 
imaginary suppliers X and Y of supplier S1.  
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Figure 18. Dyads in supply network. 
Figure 18 depicts the dyadic relationship situation at the beginning of the research. As 
the purpose of the research was to survey possibilities to form triads and utilize triads 
instead of dyads in case study part of supply network, triads are presented next. These 
predefined triads are depicted in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Triads in supply network. 
Here these five triads are formed: F-SS-Sx, Sx ϵ {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} 
One actor of each triad is the focal company’s counterparty for the supplier Sx. The 
number of the counterparty people and their positions vary in each function. Supplier SS 
is involved in required supporting role in each triad. SS provides supporting services in 
order to enable the Sxs perform the tasks assigned to them.   
Suppliers have non-contractual (loose/voluntary) relationship for mutual cooperation for 
triad’s good. This kind of voluntary cooperation may require some kind of contractual 
agreement or something a like at startup phase in order to evolve up to the voluntary 
based non-contractual cooperation later on. 
4.4. Data collection and analysis 
Survey was selected as the principal method for empirical data collection. Prior to the 
survey the briefing package of triad was created and dispatched to interviewees. The 
interviews for the persons involved in the case study were held and recorded during the 
survey. Twelve interviews were held in overall during the case study. Six interviews 
were held for the focal company representatives from the functions selected for the case 
study. The counterparty interviews for the representatives from six subcontractors were 
held respectively. The duration of an interview was about two hours. The interviews 
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were transcribed from the voice recorder recordings. Twelve separate data sheets were 
created from the transcriptions and interview notes accordingly.  
The interviewees were selected by the focal company based on the business prospects 
and availability on the date of interviews. Interviewees represent the organizations that 
are supposed to cooperate in triads. Interviewees are in charge of activities in a certain 
function or the whole business of the company. The workers interviews were left out to 
limit time of the study and amount of effort needed in order to fit study into time frame 
of assignment. The study is mainly done from management point of view. 
The substance of interview questions relates to the relational properties of relationship. 
Some of the questions were asked to be answered by giving the numerical value 
estimate for a feature in question as it is currently and target to be pursued. The rest of 
questions were open and were answered informally. Some guidance was given when 
necessary. The main purpose of the questionnaire was to find out the state of the 
relational properties among actors. (See Appendix A for more details of the 
questionnaire.) 
Survey results measured on numerical scale (e.g. from 0 to 5) were tabulated in and 
analyzed with spread sheet application. Minimum and maximum values were found and 
average values calculated. The gap between the current and target states of relational 
properties indicates a tension for change and desired direction to proceed. Each measure 
partly reveals actors’ attitude and practice in relations and thus indicates actors’ 
readiness to form and develop triad business relationship and practice. Interpreting and 
analyzing the free-form answers of the questionnaire revealed some prevailing 
assumptions and practices which are quite interesting from triadic cooperation point of 
view as well. 
4.5. Validity and reliability of results 
Construct validity identifies correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. 
Internal validity seeks to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are 
believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships. 
External validity defines the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized. 
Reliability demonstrates that the operations of a study – such as the data collection 
procedures – can be repeated, with the same results. 
For construct validity the operational measures for the relational concepts in this case 
study were identified from literature based on relational aspects. The references are in 
Table 2. Construct validity and reliability of the study can be enhanced using multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin 2009). In this study were involved twelve different source 
organizations in total. The total number of interviewees was fourteen. Internal validity 
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was tried to confirm by asking the same questions from opposite party as well. This also 
worked as a sort of confirmation to reliability since deviations in results were minor or 
none. 
It is known that people vary in the way they respond to questions. Some people tend to 
use the extreme ends of response scales, whereas others tend to center their answers to 
mid-points. Transient personal factors such as mood may also have an influence on 
responses. (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010) The effect of the previous factors is difficult to 
avoid. The situational factors were tried to prevent by allocating the same amount of 
time, space and refreshments for interviews. At the beginning of each interview, the 
triad context was clarified. So the orientation and framework for personal interview 
were equal. Unclear terms and issues were explained when required during the 
interview. 
The findings cannot be generalized outside of the case context, but on the other hand at 
least some results are likely in line with potential findings in another similar supply 
network of large construction project. Most of the actors are serving in similar projects 
elsewhere as well. The interviewees found plenty of commonalities in the area of 
project business in question. 
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5. RESULTS 
Results of the survey for the measured relational properties are presented in the 
following tables. In table 5 average values of the measures for trust, commitment, 
collaboration and relational behavior are given as the focal company side evaluates the 
suppliers and vice versa, how the suppliers evaluate the supporting supplier as a triad 
actor, and total average in the separate columns of the table.Error! Not a valid 
link.The estimated values are close to a very good level (4) in overall. Minimum value 
is shown in red cell and maximum value in green cell. F stands for the focal company 
and S for a supplier. Value estimate for relational behavior is the average value from the 
measures of relational initiativeness, informing the other about changes, confidentiality 
kept, perceived attraction on firm-level, personal chemistry match and total satisfaction. 
Separate estimates for each can be found in the result sheet in Appendix B. 
 
Table 6 shows the given target values for estimated relational properties respectively. 
Table 5. Target values for relational properties. 
Average level on scale 0-5 (poor - excellent)   
Relational 
properties 
Focal 
company 
to Ss 
Suppliers 
to Focal 
company 
Suppliers 
to SS 
supplier 
F+Ss in 
average 
Trust 4.67 4.50 4.00 4.39 
Commitment 3.67 4.83 4.00 4.17 
Collaboration 4.67 4.67 3.90 4.41 
Relational 
behavior 
4.27 4.47 3.73 4.16 
The target values are about 0.5 higher (0.56, 0.30, 0.51 and 0.52) in average. 
Table 7 shows estimated values for adaptation required and subjection forced in 
supplier’s position. F-S is the focal company’s and S-F is suppliers’ average estimate. 
Table 6. Current average values for the relational property Power. 
Power Adaptation 
(required) 
Subjection 
(forced) 
on scale: 
low(0) -
high(5) 
current target current target 
F-S Avg 4.00 4.00 2.20 2.03 
S-F Avg 3.83 3.33 1.37 0.42 
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Focal company doesn’t see need for major changes in these values, while the suppliers 
in average would like to reduce adaptation by 0.5 and subjection by 0.95. 
All relational properties in Tables 5-7 are at least very close to good level (3) when 
taking into account the reverse scale of subjection e.g. 5.0 - 2.2 = 2.8, which is 
relatively the lowest (weakest) average value among all relational properties and 
indispensable adaptation is not on either extreme ends of the scale. An assumption is 
that these relational properties are not preventing the formation of triads. Perhaps the 
subjection may have hindering effect on forming and developing triad. Next, the results 
and statements for relational properties are given one by one based on the interviewees’ 
opinion during the survey and author’s assessments. 
Trust 
Suppliers trust each other and the focal company. Level of trust is high in overall (see 
Table 8). Arrow points to the object of trust and the evaluator is on top of the column. F 
stands for the focal company and S for supplier.  Each has estimated the current and 
target values of trust.  
Table 7. Average level of trust between triad actors. 
Level of Trust 
 low(0) - high(5) F current target S current target 
F->S Avg 4,17 4,67 4,33 4,83 
S->F Avg 3,33 4,33 3,83 4,50 
Sx->SS Avg 3,20 3,50 3,50 4,00 
 
In order to close the gap of trust for the potential target some measures should be taken 
to obtain 0.5 increase in average in level of trust between triad actors. Actors cannot see 
any obstacle that would make the target impossible. 
Trust is like a foundation on which the rest of social capital is built. The more robust the 
foundation of trust is, the better it withstands the internal and external forces. In the case 
study context, the foundation of trust is solid enough for forming and developing triad 
business relationships. 
Trust has been built on the previous experiences, in many cases cooperation has 
continued over very long period of time. It is recognized as cognition-based trust, which 
is mostly based on perceived consistent behavior and good personal relationships. 
“Trust is based on good personal relations between the people with whom we have 
worked in previous projects.” In some cases trust is in part affect-based trust which in 
the case context is mostly based on the indirect focal company’s customer evaluation. 
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“Well, supplier-supplier trust is largely based on the personal relationships, any mutual 
obligations do not exist”. 
Reputation of organizations and counterparty people were evaluated to be good in 
average. Some communication difficulties have been with workers who do not manage 
the common language. This has had slightly reducing effect on trust. In these cases 
workers’ supervisor has been required as an interpreter to resolve the situation. Trust 
has been earned by actions, good performance and work well done. The previous good 
experiences of cooperation in projects increase confidence. Principal does not control 
work too much which is interpreted as a sign of trust.  
Commitment 
Level of commitment is high in the contractual relationships while not seen that 
applicable in non-contractual relationships. Commitment was seen more as kind of 
contractual issue than an inherent ingredient of business relationship and long-term 
objective of doing business together. Suppliers stated that supplier-supplier commitment 
without contract is vague. Some short of positive cash flow as a result is required for 
real supplier-supplier cooperation. 
Table 9 shows that in average the target level of commitment is about 0.6 higher, so 
there is some growth potential in commitment, especially in the supplier-supplier 
relationships. 
Table 8. Average level of commitment between triad actors. 
Commitment 
low(0) - high(5) F current target S current target 
F->S Avg 3,50 3,67 3,50 4,67 
S->F Avg 3,83 4,67 4,50 4,83 
Sx->SS Avg 3,00 4,00 3,60 4,00 
 
Relation specific investments were not very common excluding Health, Safety, and the 
Environment (HSE) matters required in the field of business in question. Clearly some 
relation specific investments were held back for large enough contracts and repayment 
prospects due to significant amount of money required in these investments. Preparing 
for unconventional requirements and more sophisticated technology (in advance) is 
expensive. 
Both the attitude and motivation levels in performing tasks were very good (4) in 
average. Some improvement here was expected from SS at operational level. All parties 
said to aim for a long-term business relationship and were slightly more willingness for 
cooperation in the future based on the earlier experiences at projects. Suppliers make 
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efforts and are committed for long-term cooperation to develop business together with 
the focal company. Suppliers are still willing to increase commitment to the focal 
company and would like to see the focal company to increase its commitment to the 
case suppliers respectively.   
Commitment to a new actor evolves during the project. Usually it is low at starting 
point. Suppliers demonstrate commitment by quality work well done on time. In current 
situation, the commitment between suppliers excluding supplier SS does not exist in 
most of the cases. An exception is between suppliers which cooperate also elsewhere. 
Collaboration 
Collaboration was evaluated to be easy with value of 3.8 in average. There is room for 
improvement though, especially between the suppliers as the target values indicate (see 
Table 10). The growth potential for collaboration is 0.55 in average. 
Table 9. Average estimates for collaboration. 
Collaboration   
importance 
in future low(0) - high(5) easiness target 
F-S Avg 4,17 4,67 4,67 
S-F Avg 4,33 4,67 4,67 
Sx-SS Avg 3,20 3,90 3,40 
Average 3,77 4,32 4,09 
 
Communication at operational level is open and informal. Confidential matters are 
treated as such. Suppliers consider that information exchange with the focal company is 
adequate, but inadequate between suppliers instead.  
Objectives are set by the focal company and suppliers do their best to fulfill the requests 
and perform tasks assigned to them. The extent of collaboration has been more or less at 
the same level or slightly increased over the projects. Collaboration has been 
experienced improving in long run. Suppliers have willingness and capability to more 
autonomous and self-directing way of working, but this would preferably require larger 
contracts as well. 
According to few actors, opportunism may occur at contract phase, but it has not been 
observed during the project. Conflict situations are quite rare and the few are usually 
resolved in meetings. Potential conflict situations arise when deviation in service order, 
timing or content occur. More detailed schedules for support services are on the 
suppliers’ wish list.  
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There are familiar people among actors, often with common work history which helps 
in collaboration. Several representatives have worked in both sides – in focal company 
and subcontractor. These inherited familiar human relations seem to be remarkably 
helpful and make things easy deal with in the present cooperation. 
Evaluation of supplier Sx-supplier SS collaboration is based quite often on the received 
feedback from the workers at field. “I haven’t heard anything negative, so it must have 
worked well”. The importance of supporting supplier SS varied among other suppliers 
greatly. While one thought highly of the cooperation the other didn’t see any need for 
the cooperation with supplier SS. 
Relational behavior 
Personal and social characteristics can have both conducive and restrictive effect on 
doing business with triad actors, the focal company and its suppliers. Personal chemistry 
match facilitates collaboration and mismatch makes it more complicated. 
Suppliers aim to be proactive. They take the initiative in finding out customer’s needs 
and requirements, and sometimes also provide development ideas in addition to 
participating in the development meetings. 
The extent of supplier-supplier interactions across different functional departments 
(lateral involvement) was evaluated to be at level 2.2 and across different hierarchical 
levels (vertical involvement) at level 1.3 on the same scale low (0) - high (5) as in all 
relational behavior measures. The target levels are 0.5 and 0.3 higher, respectively. 
Clearly the suppliers are not cooperating much in the current dyadic business 
relationship model. 
The extent of supplier-buyer interactions across different functional departments 
(horizontal involvement) was evaluated to be about 3.8 and across different hierarchical 
levels (vertical involvement) about 2.5. The target values are about 0.7 and 0.8 higher, 
respectively. As can be expected the supplier-buyer involvement is relatively high in the 
dyadic business relationship. At the operational level, the involvement is above the good 
level (3) whereas at the business level it is below it. At the project level in planning and 
scheduling phase these values (not measured as such) would likely be in between levels 
of these two mentioned management levels of a triad. 
The bilateral contacts at top management level of suppliers were very few or almost not 
at all. Some was considering it as an act behind back of the buyer and it would be open 
to question. Supplier Sx-supplier SS communication is at low level 2.2 (horizontal) and 
1.3 (vertical) in average. Communication happens mostly at the operational level in 
connection with the common daily tasks. 
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Suppliers’ initiativeness in average was estimated to be 3.3 and the target value 4.1, 
respectively. Even though the estimated value is good, here is still room for 
improvement in proactivity and initiative taking as 0.8 higher target value points it out. 
Attraction to triad companies and personal chemistry match respectively were both 
estimated to be in average 3.6 and 4.1 as the target value. As the values are greater than 
good (3), neither of these should be a preventive issue in triad forming, likely quite 
opposite, particularly as the minimum given individual value was good (3). 
Confidential and sensitive information in overall is dealt with very high mutual 
expectations as the average estimated value 4.7 points it out. Confidentiality is 
maintained properly.  
Total satisfaction in the triadic relationships at the company level was estimated in 
average to be 3.7 and 4.4 as the target value. This is an encouraging finding for triad 
forming as well. See Appendix B for more about given estimates for relational behavior. 
Power and responsibility 
Supplier takes responsibility of its own work and gives support to co-supplier when 
necessary, but can’t take responsibility of others’ work. In non-contractual business 
relationship the actors are not in charge of each other’s doings. 
Most suppliers have competence and will to take care of increasing project management 
responsibility, but still want to leave coordination to the focal company. Coordination 
should be taken care of by the focal company. The reason is that the coordinator must 
have overall picture and enough power to make decisions. In overall the suppliers see 
the coordination as the biggest challenge in common project work. 
According to the suppliers, the tasks assignment, order and responsible are clear and set 
by organization of the focal company. The focal company carries out the control and 
coordination of project tasks. 
Inappropriate use of power was not perceived unless a case of underwent unfair 
periodization or deviation in order of support service work is counted. The focal 
company has power over suppliers. The suppliers’ estimate for the required adaptation 
was at 3.9 and target at 3.7 in average. This result indicates that very high flexibility is 
required and has been achieved without great tensions. 
Estimate for subjection, i.e. a supplier thinks that it has been forced to submit something 
unwanted, was 1.7 in average and target is naturally zero (in unitary triad). Here is a 
significant tension (gap) that might cause some prejudice and precautionary measures 
that may have explicit, a sort of preventive, impact on triad cooperation as well. 
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Slight bias towards rounding up is likely in given answers. In addition the positional 
difference in given estimated values was observed and it was in average about 0.3 
higher for suppliers (i.e. S(estimated value) ≈ F(estimated value) + 0.3). Statistical 
analysis was not done due to the small size of sample for statistical generalization. 
Other features 
The motivation type for the considered triads is clustering which helps in triad 
formation and development. Countering motives were not observed. Actors’ bonds have 
been built up in number of common projects over the years. There is the common aim to 
strengthen bonds further. Social distance between actors in considered triads is small or 
does not exist because the actors know each other for long period of time in many cases. 
Previous cooperation has brought confidence and knowledge of others’ way of thinking 
and working and therefore it is now easy to collaborate with the familiar actors. 
The differences in organizational culture are mainly relating to the size and rigidity of 
organization and safety culture.  Some cultural differences are inherited from the end 
customer. The values, norms and systems of the organizations are very similar. Cultural 
distance between the organizations is relatively small. The differences of norms and 
values occur in some extent between people from different cultures. 
The products, services and production technologies of the suppliers are in line and 
suitable with the focal company, so in practice there is not significant technological 
distance between the case companies. Instead, fairly considerable time distance exists 
since in many cases the business under discussion may take place and generate cash 
flow quite far in the future. 
There is interconnectedness between relationships, but some actors do not recognize it 
and the others cannot describe the effects clearly and in detail. Perhaps the thoughts 
were out of the triad to some extent due to the unspecified nature of the question (R8) 
for interconnectedness in general. However, the true interconnectedness within a triad 
could be finally revealed at work. Certainly, there is interconnectedness between triads 
too as the same supplier SS is involved in each triad. 
The following supplier-supplier archetypes were found. A conflicting archetype in 
which one supplier didn’t see any real reason for cooperation with supplier SS in this 
particular relationship, but prefers to cooperate with another supplier (networking) as 
they have interrelated tasks affecting the progress of both. The rest of the supplier-
supplier archetypes are either transacting or networking depending on the respondent’s 
(positional) viewpoint. The contractual supplier-supplier archetype is missing since 
there is no contractual relationship among the examined suppliers. Nor is any dog-
fighting archetype present since the suppliers are not competing with each other.  
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The level of hierarchy at which collaboration takes place between the organizations 
does matter. The intensity and quality of relational behavior varies on the different 
levels of hierarchy. The frequency of interactions seems to decrease from bottom level 
to top level while the formality of exchange increases accordingly. Hence triadic 
collaboration is likely forming and developing somewhat differently on the different 
hierarchy levels of organizations partly due to the business perspective and focus on the 
level in question and interaction frequency. This has a significant impact on triad 
governance as well. 
Governance in triad 
Current governance mechanism is lead governance and it is based on network 
management through formal contracts by lead organization. From the strategy point of 
view the price and authority governance mechanisms are used. Social governance 
mechanism is mainly unutilized. The latter has its place and potential in triadic business 
practice, which in an advanced state enables lightweight social governance utilization 
alone. Currently social structure is not closed since there is structural a hole between 
suppliers as in the type I triad case. In the survey, the following governance levels were 
recognized for triad: 1) business/contractual level, 2) project control level and 3) 
operational level. On each level, the triad type, role of actors, strength of relationship 
and duration vary.  
Other notes and findings 
Some of other notes and findings in the interviews are in the following lists in no 
particular order. 
A few enablers for supplier-supplier cooperation proposed by suppliers: 
1. Turn-key contract would increase cooperation between suppliers involved in that 
subproject. 
2. Supplier-supplier cooperation requires a piecework agreement since in the 
hourly rate framework it will not come true. 
 
Suppliers’ ‘wish list’: 
 There is high seasonal variation in utilization of suppliers’ resources. Instead, 
suppliers want from one off project mode to long-term continuous collaboration 
i.e. the focal company should also offer some (smaller) projects during 
transitional period in order to make sense to invest and put extra effort into the 
relationship by supplier. Here a frame agreement could be applied for example. 
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It would be a great help also in triad development when already known counter 
actors could make long-term relationship specific investments as well. 
 More detailed schedules for support services are requested. Better visibility for 
coming service activities is needed in order to get planned tasks performed in 
proper manner on time without annoying waiting time(s). 
 Actors would like to meet at the same table to agree the common and triad rules 
and get to know each other before the project work starts. 
 Planning and installation teams from different organizations could have more 
cooperation with each other. 
Some things and comments said in the interviews: 
 “Supplier SS does not relate to us (Sy) by any means” 
 Triads should be set up case by case, since the configuration and needs vary 
 When an actor is replaced it means that everything including relationship 
building has to be started from the beginning, from zero in the worst case. 
 Supplier SS sees other suppliers as equals. Replacement of any supplier does not 
matter to supplier SS. 
 There is this kind of triad (type II) elsewhere in which a surveyed supplier buys 
services from another supplier i.e. the pursued supplier-supplier cooperation and 
self-directedness exist in the triad. So a considered type of triad works in similar 
business environment. 
 Suppliers have cooperated with a maintenance and works service supplier 
directly without mediator of the focal company in the operations at plant. A sort 
of self-directedness takes place already in small scale. 
 End customer’s requirements might be too challenging for small companies, e.g. 
having certain certificates or meeting the strict documentation requirements. 
Preliminary study phase can be quite a burden already not to mention the large 
amount of documentation to be carried out in the implementation phase. To 
carry out the documentation tasks by itself would mean that supplier had to hire 
the dedicated staff to do it. 
 The procurement of goods and materials done by the focal company (by utilizing 
the economy of scale) is mostly seen as good custom, though some suppliers are 
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ready to take a bigger independent role and tasks and purchase the materials 
themselves as well. 
Improving the working practices: 
 “Working methods inside and outside of the focal company’s production plant 
are sometimes different”. Compare and adopt the best practice.  
 “In the beginning there was change resistance for new ideas and ways of 
working, but in generally the customer has been happy for those reforms got 
through and the related cost savings”. Utilize continuous improvement and 
learning processes. 
 Many suppliers have possibility to utilize leased manpower (from abroad) and it 
has been used increasingly. This seems to have its impact on some 
“communication problems related to the missing common language” (eng) skills 
of some foreign workers. 
 There are a few ‘territorial’ anomalies which might mix a bit the views of some 
parties. Some suppliers’ employees work under supervision of the focal 
company as local staff. A supplier’s supervisor works as supervisor of a focal 
company team which consists of both the focal company’s and subcontractors’ 
employees. Making simpler and clearer organization structure (per function and 
area of responsibility) could help in resource management and task coordination 
as well as in increasing the efficiency. 
All companies in case study are important as a supplier or a customer and have good 
reputation in fulfilling agreements. Thus, the companies are not reluctant to partner 
with each other. Some suppliers are small relative to the focal company, but are still 
able to meet the demand by flexibility in acquiring required extra resources on 
demand. Partnership relation would unite triad actors and create better 
circumstances for shared innovations. Sufficient relational orientation is required to 
engage in partnering relationship. Perhaps, actions for change in some of inhibitive 
company policies, transaction-based reward systems, rigid organizational structure 
and restricted flows of communication are still required. 
 57 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The objectives and findings of thesis are reviewed briefly in this chapter. Answers to the 
research questions are given, related conclusions are made and a few proposals for 
further actions and options of triad business practice are provided. Finally, the 
suggestions for future research are proposed. 
The essential relational factors of the study are shown in Figure 21 as cohesive forces 
among the actors in triad. When these factors are in place in positive and constructive 
way, the commonly shared view of triad is possible and consequently triad forming and 
developing can be started by mutual consent. 
 
Figure 20. Relational properties as the foundation for the case triad. 
When the estimates for the relational properties are on good enough level the relational 
cohesion supports triad formation and makes it more likely since the firm foundation, a 
requirement for successful long-term cooperation, is already in place. It also helps to 
make and carry out the common plans for shared objectives. Shared visions, values and 
norms strive actors to utilize continuous learning and improvement methods better 
together for triad’s good. 
It is not possible to give one and only correct answer to qualitative assessment of 
relational issues that are based on the opinions of individuals. In spite of this, the 
answers to the research questions of the study are given next. 
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MRQ: What are the conditions for forming and developing a triad in the case study 
context? 
Based on the survey results the conditions are good for forming and developing triads. 
There is no major impediment to triads. An issue needs to be solved is the earnings 
principle that is clear and acceptable for all actors. A sort of mutual written agreement 
of compensations for supplier-supplier cooperation would supplement the triad 
framework and rules. An option is trilateral agreement. An observation from interviews 
was that some kind of contractual agreement is required in order to get the real 
commitment between suppliers. Relational factors affect circumstances in triads. Effects 
are explained in the next answer to SRQ1. 
SRQ1: How do the relational factors affect the current relationship of actors involved in 
the considered buyer-supplier-supplier triads? 
Collaboration is easier when relational factors like trust and commitment are at a good 
(3) or better level as they are already or could be in the case relationships. Currently 
relational properties are helping in well-functioning cooperation especially in the buyer-
supplier relationship. Buyer’s commitment to supplier is not as strong as vice versa. 
This is obviously due to the buyer’s aim to invite supplier to tender in order to get the 
best offer. Supplier-supplier collaboration hardly exists in the current non-contractual 
relationship, but trust and readiness to commit are good for triad cooperation. Relational 
behavior is good in overall. Business-related constraints and rules are complied with, 
companies and personnel are compatible with each other so well that total satisfaction in 
relationships (3.7) is almost at very good level (4) in average. Power is used sometimes 
in a way that suppliers think that they have been forced to do something unwanted. This 
is something that may hinder triad cooperation and needs to be solved. 
SRQ2: What are the challenges and opportunities to form and develop a triad in case 
study context? 
Some opportunities and challenges in forming and developing triad based on the 
conclusions and findings from interview discussions are listed next.  
Things that help in triad formation and development: 
1. Actors trust each other 
“Without trust, the cooperation would not have continued for this long.” 
2. Actors are committed to each other 
“We have made concrete efforts to develop our common business together.” 
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3. Actors are familiar with each other which helps in collaboration 
“We know each other, which makes collaboration easy.” 
4. The motivation type for the considered triad is clustering 
“Willingness to cooperate has increased during the previous projects” 
5. Congruent organizational culture, shared norms and values 
“We have had some problems with nondomestic actors …” 
6. Shared visions and common interests 
“At the beginning of project should be a meeting in which all actors get 
information about the project and shared objectives.” 
All the points in the list above are valid in the studied relationships. Perhaps, the shared 
visions and common interests need to be clarified and stronger applied in practice for 
getting the greater sense of cohesion and community among actors in triads. 
Things that are likely to hinder the formation and/or development of triad. 
1. The actors do not get along with each other 
2. Abuse of power 
3. Contractual issues pose obstacles 
4. Management support is missing 
5. Disruptive organizational changes 
6. Maintenance of social capital is neglected 
In list above the points 2 and 3 require attention and some actions for getting well-
functioning cooperation come true with actors in triads. Top management’s support for 
triads was not measured. Top management’s unwavering support is a vital part of 
realization of triads. All six issues need to be monitored constantly in order to be 
vigilant and able to eliminate related risks.  
SRQ3: How can the circumstances for triad forming and developing be improved? 
1. Pay attention to the starting procedures. At the beginning or even a bit earlier of 
the new project all actors involved should meet at the same table to agree the 
common and triad rules and get to know each other. 
2. Consider and set up triads case by case, since the configuration and needs vary. 
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3. Arrange common planning sessions. Planning and installation teams from 
different organizations could have more cooperation with each other. 
4. Define earnings principles. Suppliers state that supplier-supplier commitment 
without contract is vague. Some short of cash receipt is required for cooperation 
to be established in the case supply network. 
If the actors do not get along with each other well enough for one reason or another, it 
may be a reflection of poor relational properties that are at inadequate level for well-
functioning cooperation. Corrective actions are required until well-functioning 
cooperation is achieved. Replacement of an actor is an option if nothing else helps. 
However, this should be considered as a last resort, since the building of the new good 
relationships may take much time unless the actors know each other well enough. 
Based on the survey observations and analysis the triad governance aspect can be 
divided into three different management levels: business, project and operational. It 
depends on the project phase which one is emphasized. At the contract phase business 
management level governance takes place and it usually means structural hole situation 
in triad when negotiating and agreeing the separate dyadic contracts. Project 
management governance comes from project organization, plans and scheduling. The 
project schedule has tendency to change for number of reasons during the project and 
this causes deviations from the project plan, which in turn lead to some corrective 
actions in operations. Operational level governance takes place during the 
manufacturing and assembly phases with concurrent change requests from project 
organization. 
Options for triad formation at the operational level are depicted in Figure 21. The 
controllability, collaboration and self-directedness vary between these triad types. 
 
Figure 21. Operational level options of triad. 
Type I triad is basically utilized already. The focal company has separate contracts with 
suppliers based on dyad relationships. The focal company acts as intermediary and 
mediates tasks, requests and information between suppliers. The focal company does 
not gain value by mediating the transactions of suppliers. Type II triad supports turn-key 
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contract with a supplier, which in turn has contract with the other supplier (contracting 
archetype). Here a large part of coordination tasks and responsibility have been 
transferred/outsourced to the supplier Sx. The focal company’s controlling and 
monitoring tasks are substantially reduced. There is a structural hole in type II triad as 
well. Unity among actors can be achieved with type III unitary triad, in which each 
actor cooperates for the common goals and benefits with shared visions and objectives. 
Governance is based more on self-directedness than the lead actor’s commands since all 
actors are equal by default. This also means that each actor is empowered to do what it 
is expected to do. A frame agreement and partnership strategy are possibilities to 
develop triadic relationships further.  
The idea is to identify and get system-wide benefits in common collaboration and 
recognize that partner’s benefit is actor’s own benefit and vice versa. All actors are in 
the same boat, read the same charts, steer and row in the same direction commonly 
aimed for on the voyage to the known port of destination. 
SRQ4: How can the considered triads be governed? 
The lead organization governs in type I triad. This is much the same price and authority 
governance practice that is already in use. The lead supplier would take the major role 
in outsourced governance model as in type II triad providing turnkey solutions to the 
lead company by governed supplier(s). Shared governance would be a natural choice for 
type III transitive triad in which the more self-directing actors together administer the 
network. There is a trade-off between self-directedness (III) and controllability (I) from 
the lead company point of view. A separate administrative entity which governs the 
actors in triad would be a choice perhaps for a larger aggregate of triads which better 
fits for network governance. The administrative burden can be reduced in each case by 
utilizing social governance that relies on trust and sense of community. Larger amount 
of social capital paves the way for better network governance. The amount of social 
capital is up to the actors as is the deployed governance mechanism(s).  
Closed structure in transitive and unitary type III triad would increase social capital as 
well as stability of social structure and relations. The forming of unitary triad gains 
social capital, which, however, requires continuous maintenance in order to remain 
productive and favorable for the future development. 
The interviewees were in the various levels and roles of surveyed organizations, which 
on the one hand provided diversity in perspectives and opinions, but on the other hand 
made it difficult to find a common ground for analysis. Perspective of answers varied 
from supervisor to CEO in interviews and left more room for situational interpretations. 
On the other hand, this provided larger coverage of issues. 
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Results indicate a few areas that require development actions to be taken in order to 
make it easier to form well-functioning triad and triad business practices. Level of 
subjection should be reduced and the commitment and collaboration between suppliers 
increased. These improvements also affect trust positively. Triad types II and III 
promote collaboration between suppliers and thus they are proposed for trial in pilot 
projects. 
All six suppliers are willing and able to learn new things and more about each other in 
order to obtain the benefits the triad offers. The large organizations that are more 
capable to adapt the considerable changes in demand for resources are eager to take 
bigger role and responsibility with the new larger turn-key contracts.  
The objective of this study was to determine the state of relational properties for triad 
forming and developing. Selected research methods were appropriate for successful data 
collection. Even though the sample size is statistically too small for deriving the general 
conclusions from the results, the results are indicative enough in the focal company’s 
supply network for the decision-making and further actions concerning the triadic 
network business practice development. Relational properties among actors in the 
considered triads were determined by the survey i.e. this objective was achieved.  
This study concerned relational factors for triad forming and developing in the case 
company’s business context. In order to see the relational properties effects on forming 
and developing the real triads, the piloting of triads with different initial values of 
relational properties would be needed. Continuous triad would be good at the piloting 
phase. 
The possible positive consequences on performance, supplier-supplier cooperation, 
flexibility and cost savings remain to be seen in the pilot and later triad 
implementations. At least from the relational properties point of view these 
improvements can happen. Relationship quality measures were very good. Relational 
elements for triadic partnership exist. It is up to the actors to take the next step to form 
and develop triads in supply network. The triad concept can be utilized in the broader 
context of business network. The triads were seen as natural alternatives in resource 
management and in general between and within R&D organizations for example. 
Parallel sourcing strategy for multiple parts and subassembly is an option to compare 
the price, delivery and quality across different suppliers (Cousins et al. 2008, pp. 55-57). 
As an option, there can be two triads, the same or different types, performing the same 
tasks in parallel and then the results of both are compared and evaluated for decisions 
making - what is the best structural setup of actors and operational practice in future. 
The primary task of management is to get people to work together in a systematic way 
and accomplish change. Getting results is up to managers’ ability to understand which 
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tools will work in a given situation. (Christensen et al. 2005) The financial incentives 
and strengthening the common vision are some issues to start with in forming and 
developing triadic cooperation. 
To what extent the outsourcing is reasonable to realize by the customer to retain enough 
control over the whole project and still manage the whole business case properly 
depends much on how well triads are functioning and cooperating. How the set of triads 
can be well orchestrated is a matter of another study. Interconnectedness within and 
between triads could be studied better when triads are operating. 
In the survey the different governance levels of triad were revealed, but more specific 
research for triadic actors from this perspective was not done. This could be a good 
focal issue for future research to find out dynamics and interdependencies of different 
triad governance levels. Considering the external interfaces of triad could be another 
future research area which was not much touched in this study. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Triad objectives (O) flexibility, good cooperation, tech. & economic benefits etc. 
Function of the focal company + supplier SS + [supplier S1, S2, S3, S4, S5] 
Backgrounds (B): 
1. the size of company, domain, turnover, profitability 
2. interviewee’s role/position/task 
3. cooperation organizations: primary customer/supplier/subcontractor, others 
4. collaboration 
a. how did it start? 
b. duration (years, months) 
c. based on project, annual or partnership contract? 
d. times (pcs) 
Relational properties for evaluating possibilities to cooperate in triad  
Relational themes in survey: trust, commitment, collaboration, relational behavior and 
power 
Trust (T) 
1. Do suppliers trust each other and how does it appear? 
2. Do suppliers trust to the buyer and how does it appear? 
3. Has there been any reliability problems with the organization or personnel, 
what? 
4. Describe the reputation of cooperation organization?  
5. Describe the reputation of counterparty person in other organization?   
6. What kind of experience and impression have been got from cooperation so far? 
7. What is the basis of trust 
A. affective 
B. cognitive 
1. prediction of behavior (calculated), 
2. perceived consistent behavior (knowledge) or 
3. mutual understanding and common values (similarity) 
8. Level of trust (1-5): poor(1), adequate(2), good(3), very good(4), excellent(5) 
a) F - S 
b) S - F 
c) S -SS 
d) SS - S 
9. Is there reciprocity in the relationship, what kind? 
10. Is there solidarity in the relationship, how does it occur? 
11. How do the organizational culture and norms differ in organizations? 
12. Does principal control work too little, enough or too much? 
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Commitment (Com) 
1. Is supplier committed to the cooperation and common target of another supplier, 
how does it occur? 
2. Are both parties aiming at the long-term collaborative relationship? 
3. Are supplier committed to work together to achieve common objectives? 
4. Have objectives accepted together? 
5. Have relation specific investments been made? (e.g. equipment, training, 
certificates) 
6. Level of commitment (1-5): poor - excellent. 
a) F - S 
b) S - F 
c) S - SS 
d) SS  - S 
7. Does supplier keep agreed schedules? 
8. Estimate supplier’s attitude (1-5) in task execution? 
9. Estimate supplier’s motivation (1-5) in task execution? 
10. How has cooperation affected desire to cooperate in future (increased – 
decreased)? 
Collaboration (Col) 
1. Describe communication with counterparty 
a) open? 
b) confidential? 
c) informal or formal? 
d) frequency, regularity? 
2. Describe communication between suppliers 
3. Is there enough information exchange? 
4. Have the objectives set together? 
5. Which of the followings best describes the relationship: new, expanding, 
troublesome, static or lifeless? 
6. How has collaborative relationship evolved over time? 
7. How frequent are conflict situations (0-5) and how are them resolved? 
8. Is there opportunism in relationships? 
9. Does supplier have will and capability to more autonomous and self-
directedness way of doing business? 
10. How would you describe the short and long term flexibility of resources for 
changes in requirements and demand? 
11. Do the counterparties have common social relations outside of business, what 
kind of e.g. hobbies etc.? 
12. How well is the collaboration going?  (1-5): poorly - excellently 
13. How important is the collaboration in future? (1-5)  
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Relational behavior (R) 
1. Do personal and social characteristics have conducive, none, or restrictive 
impact on doing business? 
2. Is building and maintaining of personal relationships important (1-5)? 
3. Does supplier act proactively to find needs and requirements of the customer and 
contribute to the competitiveness of the customer, how does it occur? 
4. Do suppliers communicate horizontally with each other (0-5)? 
5. Do suppliers communicate vertically with each other (0-5)? 
6. To what extent, actor provides sensitive/confidential information about itself and 
is the information withheld from others? 
7. Quality of relational behavior (0-5): Sx-F F-Sx Sx-SS/SS-Sx 
a) initiativeness 
b) advance notice of intended and impending changes 
c) disclosure of sensitive information 
d) attraction 
(economic benefits, access to important resources and social 
compatibility) 
e) personal chemistry match 
f) total satisfaction 
g) interaction frequency (times/week) and 
h) richness (face-to-face, others) 
8. How does another (what?) actor-actor relationship effect on cooperation in 
actor’s own dyadic relationship? 
Power and responsibility (P) 
1. Does supplier take responsibility of its own and co-partner’s work and how does 
it occur? 
2. Does supplier have competence and will to take care of increasing project 
management responsibility? 
3. Are the tasks assignment, order and responsibility clear to all actors? 
4. Who coordinates the whole and how? 
5. Has there been any abuse of power? 
6. How much actor has been forced to adapt in cooperation (0-5)? 
7. Has actor been forced to submit to demands (0-5)? 
8. Can supplier be empowered to do work self-directly? How does it happen? 
9. How is the suppliers’ cooperation achieved? 
10. What changes triadic business model causes in the current tasks and job 
descriptions (in the focal company) compared with the current dyadic business 
model?
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APPENDIX B: MEASUREMENT RESULTS  
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    SS S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Average 
Attitude (current) 4 5 5 4 2 4 4.0 
  (target) 5 5 5 4 4 4 4.5 
Motivation (current) 4 5 5 3 3 4 4.0 
  (target) 5 5 5 4 4 4 4.5 
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